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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The 2015 Paris Agreement achieved a broad international 
consensus on a methodology to limit emissions to control climate 
change.2 By its terms, the Paris Agreement anticipates individual 
action by individual nation-states.3 But underlying this principle 
stands the fact that climate change need not and should not be 
addressed only by nation-states. Rather, combatting climate change 
requires attention at multiple levels – national, state, regional, and 
local – as well as requiring a public-private partnership to engage 
businesses in a dedicated effort to achieve meaningful results in 
abatement. This article examines overlapping competencies within 
the European Union (“EU”) and considers how various actors within 
the United States federalist system are engaged in trying to combat 
climate change. The question regarding overlapping competencies 
extends beyond the legal delineation of authority. At its core is the 
question of how to best utilize specific qualities of various 
constituencies with overlapping competencies to not only harmonize 
efforts but also to achieve maximum utilization of the efforts of 
different parties.4 Climate change is a global problem with globally 
felt externalities, and it must be addressed globally. It is not one 
that will self-resolve. Despite extensive technological advances, we 
cannot artificially create a livable habitat.5 People are dependent 
 
2. Yamide Dagnet et al., Staying on Track From Paris: Advancing the Key 
Elements of the Paris Agreement, WORLD RES. INST. 3 (May 2016), www.wri.org/
sites/default/files/Staying_on_Track_from_Paris_-_Advancing_the_Key_
Elements_of_the_Paris_Agreement_0.pdf. Though of course the United States 
commitment to the Paris Agreement has changed since the time of its 
enactment. See President Donald J. Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate 
Accord (June 1, 2017), perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP (announcing the withdrawal of the 
U.S. from the Paris Agreement); see also Chris Mooney, Trump Can’t Actually 
Exit the Paris Deal Until the Day After the 2020 Election. That’s a Big Deal., 
WASH. POST, (Dec. 12, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/
2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawal-paris-climate-deal/ 
(explaining the timeline by which the United States can withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement).  
3. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change art. 4, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris 
Agreement]. 
4. The issue is not just whether multiple levels of regulation are possible in 
combatting climate change. The issue also includes a determination of at which 
level of regulation climate change policy can most effectively be implemented. 
See Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative 
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat 
Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 231, 233 (2009) (contending 
that the multi-level government response to climate change must be as effective 
a use of resources as possible); William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, 
Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40 
(2017) (arguing that appropriate allocation of state and federal roles can reduce 
risk).  
5. The major environment problems include: (1) Major changes to the earth’s 
atmosphere and climate; (2) Destruction of the ozone; (3) Degradation of topsoil; 
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upon the continuing functioning of natural systems and habitats for 
survival. A coordinated approach to regulation among layers of 
government is essential to a properly functioning, fully utilized 
approach to climate change. 
 This article thus addresses issues of European subsidiarity and 
American federalism in the context of climate change. Part II 
provides an overview of the basic issues at stake and briefly 
sketches the effectiveness of international treaties designed to 
address climate change and other approaches to date. No prior 
international effort created the cause for optimism that attended 
the signing of the Paris Agreement.6 Part III of this article takes a 
detailed look at issues of subsidiarity and places the discussion in 
the context of climate change. Part IV examines the issue within the 
United States, as the federal government’s approaches to climate 
change have been dramatically revised over the past couple of years. 
 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE – A PRIMER 
A. The Problem 
 Climate change is the ultimate problem of the commons: when 
individuals and corporations are allowed free access to an 
exhaustible resource, the natural tendency is one of overuse.7 The 
user realizes the benefits, but a significant portion of the cost is felt 
elsewhere.8 As a result, when applied to climate change, the full 
effects of carbon emissions are not appropriately reflected in their 
price.9 In addition, if individual A does not use the resource, 
individual B will. Thus, a socially destructive race to consume the 
resource before others do is the inevitable result. 
 Multiple approaches to address the problem of carbon 
emissions have been put forth. One possibility are so called 
“command and control” regulations, where government dictates 
either limit the absolute allowed amount of an activity or mandate 
 
(4) Loss of biological diversity; and (5) Widespread air and water pollution.  
6. Justin Worland, Feeling of Optimism at Paris Climate Talks Despite 
Disagreement, TIME (Dec. 9, 2015), time.com/4143334/paris-climate-talks-
optimism-cop/. The 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as 
COP24 and held in Katowice, Poland, served largely to implement a game plan 
for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; see generally, COP24 KATOWICE 
2018, cop24.gov.pl/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019) (providing a “game plan” for 
implementing the Paris Agreement).  
7. Maebh O’Gorman, Global Warming: A Tragedy of the Commons, COMP. 
RES. IN L. & POL. ECON., Research Report No. 32/2010 (2010), digital
commons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/99/. 
8. Id. 
9. Gabriel Weil, Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving 
Beyond the Pledge and Review Model, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
923, 929-30 (2018). 
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certain required standards.10 A second core approach encompasses 
various “cap and trade” structures, which are designed to allow 
individuals and the marketplace to shape the allocation of scarce 
resources once the government has set an overall emission limit.11 
Other options include tax penalties for those who excessively emit, 
and tax credits for those who employ methodologies designed to 
limit emissions, such as tax credits for those employing clean 
energy. The problem with the latter two approaches, however, is 
that they put no upper limit on the overall level of emissions.12 
 The impact of the current level of global emissions is not fully 
quantifiable, with the worst-case scenarios leading to truly 
catastrophic consequences.13 There do, however, seem to be a few 
certainties. First, rising emissions will lead to an overall negative 
impact on global welfare.14 Second, the losses will continue to grow 
as temperatures continue to rise.15 Third, different nations will 
benefit from global emission reduction to different degrees,16 and 
the degree to which countries are affected will not fully correlate 
either with the wealth of the country or the degree to which the 
country has or has not been an offender when it comes to emissions 
standards.17 Rather, many of the most vulnerable locations which 
stand to lose the most by rising temperatures are among the poorest 
nations on the planet, including many regions of Africa and Asia.18 
 
10. Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 
UTAH L. REV. 115, 127 (2017) (requiring that cars be gas-efficient, for example).  
11. Id. at 125. In cap and trade, the government sets an overall limit by 
issuing pollution permits which can then be bought and sold on the market. Id. 
12. Perhaps it is worth noting that traditional cost benefit analysis 
measuring the costs of abatement versus the benefits of doing so are extremely 
problematic given the difficulty in determining costs in light not only of the 
difficulties of measuring long-term impact, but also of quantifying the results of 
a catastrophic worst-case scenario. Daniel A. Farber, Coping with Uncertainty: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, The Precautionary Principle, and Climate Change, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 1659, 1672 (2015). 
13. Simon Beard, Should We Care About The Worst-Case Scenario When It 
Comes To Climate Change?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 28, 2017), 
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/simon-beard/climate-change_b_18110618.html. 
14. Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Loves, 48 GA. L. REV. 
499, 501 (2014).  
15. Lance N. Long & Ted Hamilton, The Climate Necessity Defense: Proof 
and Judicial Error in Climate Protest Cases, 38 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 58, 96 (2018).  
16. Gabriel Weil, Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving 
Beyond the Pledge and Review Model, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
923, 929 (2018).  
17. Maxine Burkett, Behind the Veil: Climate Migration, Regime Shift, and 
a New Theory of Justice, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 445, 448-49 (2018). The 
biggest emitters currently include China, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, 
Russia, Japan, Brazil, and India. Johannes Friedrich et al., This Interactive 
Chart Explains World’s Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed, WORLD 
RES. INST. (Nov. 21, 2017), www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-
explains-worlds-top-10-emitters-and-how-theyve-changed. 
18. Deepa Badrinarayana, A Constitutional Right to International Legal 
Representation: The Case of Climate Change, 93 TUL. L. REV. 48, 90-91 (2018); 
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This disparate impact stems not just from geography but also from 
such factors as a country’s dependence on agriculture and the extent 
to which the nation can afford to divert resources toward efforts of 
abatement.19 
 Climate change is a problem requiring intervention by both 
nation-states and private actors. As a result, private, social, and 
market-driven incentives also potentially play a significant part in 
any successful methodology employed to address climate change. 
The activities of multinational corporations impact far more than 
their immediate economic concerns. Rather, a multinational’s 
enterprises may have broadly felt ramifications in the political, 
cultural, social, and environmental realms. Compliance by 
multinationals is critical to any successful sustainable development 
program.20 Currently, only six nation-states have revenues larger 
than the revenues of the largest transnational corporations.21 As 
corporations continue to grow in power and to affect not just 
economic development but also the quality of life world-wide, their 
impact on the planet will increasingly outweigh that of many 
national governments.  
 
B. International Approaches to Date  
 The international community’s approach to climate change has 
largely centered on the creation of a series of international 
agreements which collectively thus far have had little success in 
achieving abatement.22 The impetus for the need to address climate 
change began in earnest upon the wide-spread acceptance of the 
 
Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for 
Subational Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 37 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 44 (2019). As a result, the poor in the future are by far the greatest likely 
to suffer the most from a lack of abatement efforts. Id. 
19. See Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sumudu Atapattu, International 
Environmental Law, Environmental Justice, and the Global South, 26 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 230-31 (2017) (arguing that the North-
South divide is a significant factor in the inability to stop environmental 
degradation). 
20. Behnam Taebi & Azar Safari, On Effectiveness and Legitimacy of 
‘Shaming’ as a Strategy for Combatting Climate Change, 23 HARV. SCI. & ENG’G. 
ETHICS 1289 (Apr. 11, 2007).  
21. NEIL BOTTEN, CIMA OFFICIAL LEARNING SYSTEM: ENTERPRISE 
STRATEGY 62 (2009). “Of the worlds [sic] 100 largest economic actors, 29 were 
transnational companies and only 6 nation states had revenues larger than the 
top 9 transnationals.” Id. See also Fernando Belinchón & Ruqayyah Moynihan, 
25 Giant Companies That are Bigger Than Entire Countries, BUS. INSIDER 
ESPAÑA (July 25, 2018), www.businessinsider.com/25-giant-companies-that-
earn-more-than-entire-countries-2018-7 (noting power of world’s largest 
corporations).  
22. David G. Victor, Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate 
Diplomacy, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 15, 2015), e360.yale.edu/features/why_
paris_worked_a_different_approach_to_climate_diplomacy (noting the lack of 
success of pre-Paris Agreement attempts to combat climate change).  
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link between economic development and climate change.23 
Alongside this recognition came the acceptance of a competing value 
– namely, the desire to respect the sovereignty of nations over their 
natural resources.24 A conflict of course exists. The desire to 
recognize sovereign control is also an implicit recognition of the 
international community’s limitation in regulating environment 
transforming activity.25 
 In the late 1980s, as concern about the environment and 
climate change began to receive ever-growing attention, the 
international community first convened the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).26 The IPCC was created under 
the United Nations Environment Program and that of the World 
Meteorological Organization; it was charged with engaging in the 
scientific study of climate change.27 The IPCC is currently in its 
sixth assessment cycle; to date it has produced five reports, each 
broken into sections stemming from the work of the IPCC’s three 
primary working groups: (1) the physical science basis of climate 
change; (2) impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability; and (3) 
mitigation of climate change.28 The first and second IPCC reports 
provided much of the scientific basis for two watershed moments in 
international climate change conventions – the 1992 Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.29 
 The Framework Convention arose from the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, known as the Earth 
Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro.30 The level of 
participation at Rio was unusually widespread, with all UN 
member states plus more than 50 intergovernmental organizations 
in attendance.31 The Conference produced two new multilateral 
treatises.  
 The major one was the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
 
23. Channing Arndt et al., Economic Development under Climate Change, 
16 REV. OF DEV. ECON. 463 (2012) (examining relationship between climate 
change, growth, and investment in infrastructure). 
24. David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, 
and Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (2013). 
25. Id. 
26. David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: 
A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 518 (2015). 
27. Id.  
28. Report, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), 
www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-cycle/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
29. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 464–70 (1993) 
(explaining the role of IPCC in addressing the magnitude and impact of climate 
change). 
30. Takacs, supra note 24, at 519. 
31. Nico Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in 
International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status, in 2 POCKET BOOKS HAGUE 
ACAD. OF INT’L L. 64, 68 (2008). 
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Change; the other was the Convention on Biological Diversity, with 
the latter reaffirming that states are responsible for conserving 
their biological diversity and for using their biological resources in 
a sustainable manner.32 It also produced the non-binding Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, which is comprised 
of 27 principles on the environment and development – the Rio 
Declaration.33 
 The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is among the most important historical attempts at 
integrating sustainable development and global environmental 
concerns.34 It reflected a significant effort to achieve a balance 
between global, regional, and local concerns, as well as a recognition 
of the issues that had historically arisen in the North - South 
debate.35 Its stated objective was to stabilize greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system,” and that such stabilization 
“should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner.”36 It represented the most 
politically important collaboration prior to Paris, bringing together 
social, economic, and environmental factors within one framework. 
There are 165 signatories to the Framework Convention, including 
the United States.37  
 The Framework Convention incorporated a number of 
components, including procedural requirements for data exchange 
and reporting, a provision for adoption of ancillary protocols, rules 
for adoption and amendment of both the Convention itself and any 
protocols, a provision for periodic conferences of the parties to the 
Convention, and requirements for periodic review of scientific 
developments.38 In addition, it contained discussion of such topics 
 
32. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 
I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). 
33. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Perhaps the most significant part of its 27 
Principles is set forth in Principle 4, which affirms that in order to achieve 
sustainable development, environmental protection must constitute an integral 
part of the development process. Id. at princ. 4. 
34. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Framework 
Convention].  
35. Id.  
36. Id. at art. 2. 
37. Status of Treaties: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Mar. 16, 2019), treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp
=mtdsg3&clang=_en. 
38. Framework Convention, supra note 34. 
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as intergenerational equity, common but differentiated 
responsibilities, and sustainable development.39 Also, the 
Convention set forth the goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations “at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.”40  
 While broadly applicable within the Framework Convention, 
the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities 
specifically delineated two primary groups of signatories. The first 
group of nations41 was charged with the obligation to “communicate 
. . . detailed information on their policies and measures . . . with the 
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels . . . 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases . . . .”42 In addition, excluding those states transitioning to a 
market economy, the countries so identified in Annex 1 were 
obligated provide to financial resources to developing country 
parties for mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer.43 The 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities charged 
developed countries with a responsibility for a larger share of 
emissions reductions, both because of their greater wealth44 and 
because developed countries had caused the largest share of 
environmental the harm to date.45  
 But the Framework Convention lacked elements needed for 
meaningful implementation. It contained no binding limits on 
emissions.46 Rather, its language was largely aspirational.  
However, one clear benefit stemming from the Framework 
Convention is that it required developed countries to produce 
annual inventories of their emissions.47 
 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol specified the obligations of 
industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse 
 
39. Id. at art. 3.  
40. Id. at art. 2.  
41. Australia, Austria, Belarus†, Belgium, Bulgaria†, Canada, Croatia*†, 
Cyprus*, Czech Republic*†, Denmark, European Economic Community, 
Estonia†, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary†, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia†, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania†, Luxembourg, Malta*, Monaco*, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland†, Portugal, Romania†, Russian 
Federation†, Slovakia*†, Slovenia*†, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine†, United Kingdom, and United States of America (Countries added by 
amendment after the instrument’s initial adoption are indicated by *. Countries 
that were in the process of undergoing a transition to a market economy and 
identified as such in Annex I are indicated by †). Id. at annex I. 
42. Id. at art. 4(2).  
43. Id. at art. 4(3).  
44. Framework Convention, supra note 34. 
45. Shyam Saran, Paris Climate Talks: Developed Countries Must Do More 
Than Reduce Emissions, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2015), www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/nov/23/paris-climate-talks-developed-countries-must-do-
more-than-reduce-emissions. 
46. Framework Convention, supra note 34, at art. 4. 
47. Id. at art. 4(1)(a), 12. 
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gases and formulated these obligations in strict legal terms.48 It 
received 84 signatures during the initial period it was open for 
signature, but not by the United States – the only major country 
which declined to ratify it.49 The Kyoto Protocol stated that between 
2008 and 2012, the emission of 6 types of greenhouse gases should 
be 5% lower than in 1990.50 Its provisions included directives to 
parties to promote sustainable changes by implementing policies 
such as energy efficiency in their respective national economies,51 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases,52 promoting sustainable 
farming practices,53 and researching and promoting new forms of 
energy.54 But the Kyoto Protocol did not impose emissions limits on 
developing countries, nor did it impose significant burdens on most 
other countries, including China, the world’s largest emitter.55 
While there had been numerous other world summits and 
conventions prior to Paris, none of them effectuated real change in 
the regulation of emissions and the control of climate change.56  
 Any successful approach will have to include all emitting 
nations, including developing nations. In Paris, the result came 
close to achieving that goal. 
 
C. The Paris Agreement (and Beyond) 
 At its signing, the Paris Agreement was hailed as historic.57 
Binding and global, it applies to developed and developing countries 
alike.58 It provides for a new paradigm for climate change 
regulation, envisioning increased action on climate change 
throughout the world. Its scope is broad, addressing mitigation, 
adaptation, and ‘loss and damage’ – the latter aimed at addressing 
harms caused by climate change – and it establishes processes for 
 
48. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
49. The Kyoto Protocol – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE 
CHANGE, unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification (last 
visited April 6, 2019).  
50. Id. at art. 3(1).  
51. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(i).  
52. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(vi)-(viii).  
53. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(iii).  
54. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(iv).  
55. Henry Bewicke, Chart of the Day: These Countries Have the Largest 
Carbon Footprints, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 2, 2019), www.weforum.org/
agenda/2019/01/chart-of-the-day-these-countries-have-the-largest-carbon-
footprints/. 
56.Victor, supra note 22.  
57. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Historic 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 195 Nations Set Path to Keep Temperature 
Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 13, 
2015), unfccc.int/news/finale-cop21 [hereinafter UNFCCC Historic Paris 
Agreement]. 
58. Id. 
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financing and for technology transfer.59 The Paris Agreement 
entered into force on November 4, 2016, 30 days after the date in 
which at least 55 parties to the Convention, accounting for a total 
of 55% of the greenhouse gas emissions, had ratified it.60 It allows 
for withdrawal after three years from the date the Agreement 
became effective.61 As of this writing, 185 Parties have ratified the 
Paris Agreement.62  
 While recognizing differentiation by, among other things, 
taking into consideration the difference in circumstances each 
country faces in terms of capacity and operational ability to combat 
climate change,63 the Paris Agreement adopts an approach which 
specifies the same core obligations for all signatories.64 The Paris 
Agreement sets a goal of holding warming well below 2 degrees, 
with efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degrees.65 It aims for greenhouse 
gas emissions to peak as soon as possible, and to achieve net zero 
emissions by the second half of the 21st century.66 It contains a 
requirement for mitigation measures of individual countries to be 
expressed in nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”), and it 
requires that this process of NDCs be revised at least every five 
years.67 There is also a mechanism for countries to achieve NDCs 
 
59. Id. 
60. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change art. 21(1), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris 
Agreement].  
61. Id. at art. 28(1).  
62. Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE 
CHANGE, unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2019); Status of Treaties: Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
63. Id. at preamble. The Preamble states in part: 
Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the 
Convention, Taking full account of the specific needs and special 
situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and 
transfer of technology, Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only 
by climate change, but also by the impacts of the measures taken in 
response to it.  
Id. 
64. See Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 2(2) (stating “[t]his 
Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances”).  
65. Id. at art. 2(1)(a) (“[h]olding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate 
change”).  
66. Id. at art. 4(1).  
67. Id. at art. 4(2), (9).  
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jointly by working together on shared emissions targets.68 The Paris 
Agreement establishes a mechanism for both private and public 
entities to support sustainable development projects.69 Also 
included is a commitment to a collective goal of providing USD 100 
billion per year to 2025, and beyond 2025 with USD 100 billion as a 
floor.70 The Agreement recognizes the need for flexibility and 
transparency, and it takes into account the fact that signatories 
have different capabilities and issues in addressing climate change. 
It also contains a compliance mechanism that is designed to be 
facilitative rather than punitive in nature.71 
 Amongst its myriad provisions, it is worth highlighting a 
handful which provide for a marked delineation from past 
approaches. First, it is legally binding.72 Next, unlike Kyoto, it is 
global, applying to developed and developing countries alike.73 In 
addition, it abandons the approach to differentiation of the 
Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in favor of an 
approach which specifies the same core obligations for all 
signatories while still taking into consideration the difference in 
circumstances each country faces in terms of its capacity and 
operational ability to combat climate change. Next, its focus is long-
term, and it creates a structure for ongoing compliance, requiring 
parties every five years to reassess their progress to date and to 
make emission reduction plans for the next five-year period 
accordingly.74 Included within this is the expectation that the 
actions of each signatory country will grow progressively more 
aggressive over time.75 Also, the level of transparency it requires is 
not only novel but very significant: if a country fails to carry out its 
NDC it will be common knowledge to all.76 And finally, the extent of 
Agreement is unprecedented. 
 Noteworthy, however, is what the Paris Agreement does not 
do. It contains no firm imposition of any emission reduction 
 
68. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 4(16)-(18), 5(2). 
69. Id. at art. 6(4).  
70. Id. at art. 9; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Climate Finance, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, unfccc.int/topics/climate-
finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations (last visited Apr. 18, 
2019). 
71. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 15(2). 
72. UNFCCC Historic Paris Agreement, supra note 57. Though admittedly 
there are numerous non-binding elements contained within.  
73. Id. As of this writing, 184 countries have put forth nationally determined 
contributions. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOL., www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa/ (last visited Apr, 18, 
2019); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NDC 
Registry (interim), UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, www4.unfccc.int/
sites/NDCStaging/pages/All.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).  
74. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 4. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at art. 4(5), (12). 
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obligations.77 It includes no clear, quantifiable financial 
commitment on the part of developed countries to assist developing 
countries with achieving mitigation and adaptation.78 Nor does it 
impose specific climate change policy or binding reduction targets.79 
 Until Paris, most of what had emerged from the international 
community relating to climate change were non-comprehensive and 
neither sufficiently binding nor sufficiently substantive. Any 
successful approach will have to include all emitting nations, 
including developing nations. While the Paris Agreement comes 
close to achieving that goal, the results remain to be seen. According 
to the Climate Action tracker, no major industrial nation is 
currently on track to meet its obligations under the Paris 
Agreement.80 
 Post-Paris, the most recent meeting of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was COP24 in 
December of 2018, which gave rise to the “Katowice Climate 
Package” (“the Package”).81 The Package was designed to 
implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement by, in essence, 
creating a “rulebook” which would provide uniform standards to 
measure and track the progress made by each country toward 
meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.82  
 Despite President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United 
States from the Paris Agreement, the United States participated in 
COP24.83 The United States pushed for a uniform methodology to 
measure emissions, one of the major accomplishments from the 
COP24 meeting.84 All parties are to use the same standards to 
measure and track emissions, with uniformity presumably helping 
with transparency,85 the result being increased motivation of 
developing and developed countries alike to reach their climate 
 
77. Id. at art. 4, 7, 9-11, 13. 
78. Id. at art. 9(1). 
79. Id. at art. 4(4). 
80. See CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, climateactiontracker.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2019) (tracking where countries are in relation to NDC’s of the Paris 
Agreement). 
81. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New Era of 
Global Climate Action to Begin Under Paris Climate Change Agreement, 
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 15, 2018), unfccc.int/news/new-era-of-
global-climate-action-to-begin-under-paris-climate-change-agreement-0. 
82. Waskow et al., COP24 Climate Package Brings Paris Agreement to Life, 
WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 21, 2018), www.wri.org/blog/2018/12/cop24-climate-
change-package-brings-paris-agreement-life. 
83. Office of the Spokesperson, Outcome of the 24th Session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP24) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Dec. 15, 2018), www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2018/12/288121.htm. 
84. Brad Plumer, Climate Negotiations Reach an Overtime Deal to Keep 
Paris Pact Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/
climate/cop24-katowice-climate-summit.html. 
85. Id. 
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change targets.86 Concerns continue to include that there is an 
inadequate framework to clarify how wealthier countries will 
financially aid developing countries that need financial assistance 
to meet their targets.87 There is also concern over whether the 
current commitments will be enough to meet the Paris Agreement 
target.88 Accounting for carbon credits and their impact on parties’ 
targets was also delayed.89  
 Despite these concerns, the hope following COP24 is that the 
“rulebook” will provide the necessary framework to implement the 
Paris Agreement.90 
 
D. Introduction to the EU and Climate Change 
 Multilevel governance issues in the area of climate change are 
critical following the Paris Agreement. While the international 
community has improved its regulatory approach to climate change, 
the actual implementation of those policies has been increasingly 
moving to local levels of government.91 This process aligns well with 
the European Union system of subsidiarity, which stipulates that 
policymaking should occur at the lowest effective level.92 The 
 
86. Id. 
87. Waskow et al., supra note 82. 
88. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, The World Still Isn’t Meeting Its Climate 
Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2018), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/07/
climate/world-emissions-paris-goals-not-on-track.html. See also COP24 
Agreement: Does it Go Far Enough?, EURONEWS (Dec. 17, 2018), www.euro
news.com/2018/12/17/cop24-agreement-does-it-go-far-enough (describing that 
many believe that the COP24 approach will be insufficient to achieve goals of 
Paris Agreement). 
89. Fiona Harvey, What was Agreed at COP24 in Poland and Why Did it 
Take so Long?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2018), www.theguardian.com/environment/
2018/dec/16/what-was-agreed-at-cop24-in-poland-and-why-did-it-take-so-long; 
See also Brad Plumer, Climate Negotiators Reach an Overtime Deal to Keep 
Paris Pact Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/
climate/cop24-katowice-climate-summit.html (noting that revisions to the 
carbon trading market rules would be postponed).  
90. Katowice: COP24 Climate Change Deal to Bring Pact to Life, CARBON 
BRIEF (Dec. 17, 2018), www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/katowice-cop24-climate-
change-deal-to-bring-pact-to-life.  
91. Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Learning from the Leader: The 
European Union’s Renewable Energy Mandates as a Blueprint for American 
Environmental Federalism, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 200-02 (2012); see Allison 
C.C. Hoppe, State-Level Regulation as the Ideal Foundation for Action on 
Climate Change: A Localized Beginning to the Solution of a Global Problem, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1631 (2016) (noting action by state level government on 
climate change); Amy Hsu & Amy Weinferter, All Climate Politics is Local: After 
Trump’s Paris Withdrawal, Subnational Groups Have Stepped Up , FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Sept. 24, 2018), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-
09-24/all-climate-politics-local (describing movement of climate action to local 
government and the private sector). 
92. ALAIN-G GAGNON, SOEREN KEIL & SEAN MUELLER, UNDERSTANDING 
FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION (2015); MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND 
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principle of subsidiarity is not focused on allocation of power, but 
rather on the regulation of the use of powers between the EU and 
its Member States.93 Article Five of the Treaty on the European 
Union (“TEU”) states that “[t]he limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral.”94  
 The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality and Article 4 adds that 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
with the Member States.”95 The Treaty and the EU Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) case-law collectively suggest that few areas that do not fall 
within the competences of the Union, either directly or indirectly. 
However, the third paragraph of Article 5 makes clear that the 
subsidiarity principle governs all non-exclusive competences.96 
Each policy not exclusively given to the EU has to clear a two-fold 
test in order to verify the best decision-making level of government 
allocation.97 First, the EU bodies must demonstrate that the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States “either at central level or at regional and local 
level.”98 Second, it must be demonstrated that the proposed action 
“by reason of the scale or effects, can be better achieved at Union 
level.”99 What constitutes “sufficiently achieved” is not clearly 
articulated, and it may relate not just to effectiveness, but also to 
the degree a process is democratic or consistent with other EU 
policy. Since environmental policy is not a competence exclusively 
given to the EU, the principle of subsidiarity applies to that specific 
matter.100  
 
EUROPEAN UNION, THE BUILDING OF EUROPE, 1950-2000, at 231 (2000); 
ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW 244 (2009); RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING 
FEDERALISM SYSTEMS 6, 92 (3rd ed. 2008). 
93. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 3(b), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. 
(C 306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
94. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union art. 5, Oct. 
15, 2012, (C 326) [hereinafter TEU].  
95. Id. at art. 4; Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 3(b)(2). 
96. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5. 
[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union 
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can either be by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.  
Id.; See also Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 5(3) (setting forth the 
means by which the TEU will be applied). 
97. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 3(b)(3). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in 
the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
846, 848 (1993). 
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 EU issues in regard to subsidiarity and climate change arise 
when nation-states balk at accepting federalization of policy and 
institute national and local policies instead.101 Complicating this 
further has been the EU’s willingness to support national climate 
change adaptation and mitigation programs, believing that such 
programs will eventually be consolidated.102 The result has been 
that member states proactively acting on climate change have 
focused more on national than on European goals. 103 
 In the EU, the European Committee of the Regions, the EU’s 
political assembly of regional and local government entities, 
represents sub-national governments in the EU’s decision-making 
process.104 The regions and cities have become indispensable parts 
of climate change negotiation, in no small part due to their expertise 
in policy-making.105 In addition, the Covenant of Mayors, launched 
by the European Commission in 2008, has brought together more 
than 6,500 signatories, representing 210 million inhabitants, 
further bringing multi-level governance to climate change.106 An 
Integrated Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy now 
addresses both climate change mitigation and climate change 
adaption under a single entity.107  
 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EU: SUBSIDIARITY, THE 
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, EFFICIENCY, AND THE EU LAW-
MAKING PROCESS 
 The EU’s multilevel governance goes under the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is not focused on powers allocation, but rather 
 
101. Andrew Jordan & Tim Jeppesen, EU Environmental Policy: Adapting 
to the Principles of Subsidiarity?, 10 EUR. ENV. 64, 66 (2000).  
102. Commission Green Paper on Adapting to Climate Change in Europe: 
Options for EU Action, COM (2007) 354 (June 29, 2007), eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/ EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0354&qid =1488204560202
&from=EN. 
103. Isabelle Niang-Diop & Henk Bosch, Formulating an Adaptation 
Strategy, in ADAPTATION POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: 
DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, POLICIES & MEASURES, 185-86 (Bo Lim & Erika 
Spanger-Siegfried eds., 2005). 
104. THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL RESEARCH § 9.01 (1)(d)(iii)(B) (2018). See also European Committee of the 
Regions (CoR), EUROPEAN UNION, europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-committee-regions_en (last visited Apr. 7, 
2019). 
105. Cécile Barbière, Regions Push For Greater Influence in Climate 
Negotiations, EURACTIV (Nov. 23, 2015), www.euractiv.com/section/climate-
environment/news/regions-push-for-greater-influence-in-climate-negotiations/. 
106. Committee of the Regions, EU Cities and Regions Leading the Way 
Against Climate Change: COP21 In Paris, at 17, EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 2015), 
cor.europa.eu/en/engage/brochures/Documents/EU%20cities%20and%20region
s%20leading%20the%20way%20against%20climate%20change/COP21.pdf. 
107. Id. 
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on the regulation of the use of powers between the EU and the 
Member States.108  
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union 
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level.109 
 Member States, however, are often unhappy about the 
definition of what goes under EU control and what lies on their own 
authority. 
 The wording of Article 5(3) raised well-founded doubts on the 
legal nature of subsidiarity in the EU legal system. Whether the 
principle of subsidiarity could be used as the legal basis in front of 
the ECJ or whether it would only produce limited political effects is 
still strongly debated.110 Such doubts regarding the criteria given in 
paragraph two for justifying the EU action: “not sufficiently” and 
“better” are indeed very ambiguous legal concepts.  
 That provision only regards the relationship between the 
Community and the Member States and leaves the sub-national 
level – mainly the regions – out.111 Moreover, it refers to the 
relationship between the EU and the Member States as a whole, not 
an individual State; but in some policy areas of the EU legal system, 
powers are distributed differently.112 Finally, the principle of 
subsidiarity concurs with other principles in the Treaty and cannot 
claim priority in all cases.113  
 The lack of a secure legal basis has called for a general 
consensus about the function of subsidiarity as a mere political 
issue.114 A lot of EU policies are not competences exclusively given 
 
108. See TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5(1) (stating that “[t]he limits of Union 
competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality” 
and Article 4 adds that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States.” Id. at art. 4).  
109. Id. at art. 5(3).  
110. See Gabriél A. Moens & John Trone, The Principle of Subsidiarity in 
EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: Panacea or Placebo?, 41 J. LEGIS. 65, 77-
78 (2015) (explaining that the majority of constitutional courts focus on 
subsidiarity as a legal issue).  
111. Ian Bache, Multi-level Governance and European Union Regional 
Policy, in MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 165-78 (Ian Bache & Matthew Finders, 
eds., 2004); Elizabeth Bomberg & John Peterson, European Union Decision 
Making: The Role of Sub-National Authorities, 46 POL. STUD. 219, 219–35 
(1998).  
112. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C 326/1) [hereinafter TFEU], art. 3-6.  
113. Thomas Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: 
Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD, 267-
82 (2012).  
114. Andrea Biondi, Subsidiarity in the Courtroom, in EU LAW AFTER 
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to the EU, and they fall into the so-called shared competences.115 
Thus, the struggle between the communitarian and the 
(inter)national approach (which is represented inside the very 
European Union main institutions) asks to investigate what is the 
legal basis, the most appropriate level of decision-making, and the 
better trade-off about the way to legislate.116 Those issues are still 
of great relevance, because they have been the cause of many of the 
restraints that EU regulation has had to face.117 
 EU lack of legitimacy is still widely claimed by the general 
public opinion and most scholars.118 Yet, Member States’ interests 
have not disappeared at the EU level.119 Main reasons for the EU 
institutions’ democratic deficit lie on the high rates of abstention in 
the European Parliament elections.120 Others point out the absence 
of an EU government voted in or out by citizens.121 Thus, it is 
unlikely for the people to express their direct approval or 
disapproval of EU policies. As a result, “policy making at the EU 
level can be characterized as policy without politics, which in turn 
makes for national politics without policy, as increasing numbers of 
policies are transferred from the national political arena to the 
EU.”122 
 That is why the EU law-making process used to be so 
burdensome. Political representations at the Parliament, Council, 
and Commission levels often struggle to find agreements on 
normative texts to reconcile the interests of the community with 
those of the nation-states, both represented on the EU institutional 
ground, causing broad inefficiency of the European law-making 
 
LISBON 213, 216 (Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & Stefanie Ripley eds., 2012). 
115. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 10-12 (setting out various policies to 
follow under TFEU).  
116. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 121-149 (5th ed., 2011) (analyzing the EU decision-making process).  
117. See generally Robert Podolnjak, Explaining the Failure of the European 
Constitution: A Constitution-Making Perspective, 57 COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
ZAGREB L. FAC. 5 (2007) (analyzing voting and constitutions in the EU).  
118. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 149-156 (evaluating 
democracy in the EU and the lack of legitimacy argument).  
119. Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Models: Polity, People and System, in 
LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9-17 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds. 
1998).  
120. See 2019 European election results, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, (June 24, 
2019), www.election-results.eu/turnout/ (setting forth the turnout in the EU 
Parliament elections since 1979, showing how differently EU voters have been 
participating to the polls, and showing how each single Country’s turnout has 
been decreasing through time).   
121. Weiler, supra note 119, at 4-5 (defining the EU’s undemocratic 
governmental structure as “inverted regionalism”). See also CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, 
supra note 116, at 150 (pointing to the central power of decision-making in 
Brussels).  
122. Vivian A. Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union 
Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’, 61 POL. STUD. 2, 12 (2013).  
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process.123 Politics and procedures have often failed to keep up with 
the timing of the actual needs of Member States and their 
populations.124  
 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced two different institutional 
tools to try and ease the law-making process. On the one hand, it 
introduced the so-called “early warning system,” to make the 
nation-states more involved in the monitoring of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality (which enhances legitimacy in the 
EU).125 On the other, it introduced the so-called “conciliation 
procedure” after the (fruitless) second reading of the ordinary 
legislative procedure, to give the Parliament and the Council the 
chance to find an agreement on any proposed legislative text (which 
apparently reduces legitimacy in the EU).126 
 Was it enough? Were those tools capable to solve the 
inefficiency-legitimacy deficit ratio of the EU law-making process? 
 
A. Toward a Major Role of the Nation-States 
 When compared to the American federal system, the EU 
contains a rather complicated system of division of powers between 
the Member States and the Union, which the European Treaties 
have essentially codified.127  
 The basis of the principle of subsidiarity lies in the social 
doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, because it can be seen as 
an adaptation of that principle to European Union governance.128 
 Within the European Community, the principle of subsidiarity 
appeared for the first time in the Report on European Union in 
1975129 and later in the European Parliament's Draft Treaty on 
 
123. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 150.  
124. Id. 
125. Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality art. 6, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, C 202/206 (2009), 
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/protocol_no_2_on_the_application_of_the_prin
ciples_of_subsidiarity_and_proportionality_dec2004_en.pdf [hereinafter 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality].  
126. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294. 
127. Rudolf Hrbek, The Role of the Regions in the EU and the Principle of 
Subsidiarity, 38 THE INT’L SPECTATOR 59, 69 (2008).  
128. Michelle Evans, The Principle of Subsidiarity in European Union Law: 
Some Comparisons with Catholic Social Teaching, 3 SOLIDARITY 61, 62 (2013). 
Subsidiarity’s core is that the action of a larger group should be restricted to 
supporting individuals or smaller groups only if they are incapable of 
performing the task. Id. The higher authority is not allowed to take action which 
the lower level government is capable of well performing on its own (more 
efficient action is not a sufficient criterion). Id. If this is not the case, then the 
higher authority is obliged to give support. Id.  
129. Leo Tindemans, Report on European Union, BULL. OF THE EUR. COMTY, 
(Supp. 1/76 1975), aei.pitt.edu/942/1/political_tindemans_report.pdf. The 
Report on the European Union was published on December 29, 1975 and 
presented to the European Council in Luxembourg on April 2, 1976. The 
Tindemans Report, CVCE.EU, www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/
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European Union of 1984.130 It was first implemented, however, with 
the Single European Act of 1987 (subsidiarity then referred only to 
environmental policy) and then extended to all fields of shared 
competence by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.131 Until the Lisbon 
Treaty, however, it has only served as a symbolic principle because, 
on the one hand, it did not play an essential role in the legislative 
actions by both the European Parliament (“EP”) and national 
parliaments; and on the other hand, courts only reviewed the 
procedure and the reasoning for policy measures in a very marginal 
way.132 There is a general feeling amongst legal scholars that the 
principle of subsidiarity is a “non-binding political principle,” i.e., a 
principle of which the enforcement thereof essentially must lie in 
the hands of political institutions.133 Therefore, as detailed in the 
following paragraphs, the role of the national parliaments and the 
courts in enforcing the principle of subsidiarity has been widely 
limited.134  
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132. See Biondi, supra note 114, at 214, 218, 227 (concluding that the 
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 This is probably the reason why the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced significant new elements, along with the annexed 
Protocols on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU and on the 
Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The 
Protocols ensure the Member States, the Committee of the Regions, 
and the Court of Justice play a major role in the ex-ante political 
control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity by EU bodies.135 
 According to the Protocols, national parliaments are now asked 
to check all legislative proposals for their compatibility with 
subsidiarity through the so-called early warning system.136 The 
Committee of the Regions is now entitled to bring legal actions 
before the ECJ.137 Consequently, the ECJ is given a specific 
jurisdiction to hear actions sued by the Member States - on behalf 
of their national parliament or a chamber of it - and the Committee 
of the Regions for the respect of the principle of subsidiarity.138  
 The two Protocols establish a dual system. One provides for the 
transmission from the Commission to national parliaments (at the 
same time as to the EP and the Council) of both “consultation 
documents” and “draft legislative acts” granting nation-states 
unlimited scrutiny over them.139 
 Article 5 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality states that “Draft European 
legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.”140 This provision introduces the 
early warning system provided by Articles 6 and 7, which includes 
the possibility for national parliaments (or each chamber of national 
parliaments, in the case of bicameral systems) to send a reasoned 
opinion “stating why it considers that the draft in question does not 
 
135. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - Protocols and Annexes 
- 1. Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2004 
O.J. (C 310) 204; Official Journal of the European Union, Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, C 310/207, 
16.12.2004. Both Protocols come from the working group appointed during the 
Laeken European Council (2001) which highlighted that the principle of 
subsidiarity is essentially political and that the responsibility for it should 
therefore rest with political bodies. In its final report, the working group 
recommended, on the one hand, to setting up a political early warning system 
to strengthen the national parliaments’ monitoring of the principle of 
subsidiarity; on the other hand, to expanding the scope to referral to the ECJ 
on grounds of failure to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Conclusions 
of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, Brussels, 
2002. 
136. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 6, 8. 
137. Id.  
138. Id.  
139. Id. at art. 2, 3 (extending to eight weeks the period that shall elapse 
between a draft legislative act being made available to national parliaments in 
the official languages of the Union and the date when it is placed on the 
provisional agenda of the Council for its adoption (after the following ten days)). 
140. Id. at art. 5. 
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comply with the principle of subsidiarity.”141 
 The Commission “shall take account of the reasoned opinions 
issued by national parliaments or by a chamber of national 
Parliament.”142 Each parliament has two votes.143 In the case of a 
bicameral system, each chamber shall have one vote.144 When 
reasoned opinions represent at least one third (one quarter on the 
area of freedom, security, and justice) of the votes allocated to 
national parliaments, “the draft must be reviewed.”145 However, the 
Commission is still not bound by the reasoned opinions because it 
can decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the act, giving reasons 
for its decision.146 
 Paragraph 3 of Article 7 includes another additional 
guarantee, the so-called “orange card.”147 Under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, when reasoned opinions on the non-
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least a 
simple majority of the votes of national parliaments, the 
Commission can still decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
proposal.148 However, if the proposal is maintained, the Commission 
must, in a reasoned opinion, justify why it considers that the 
proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.149 As the 
second subparagraph of Article 7(3) states, 
This reasoned opinion, as well as the reasoned opinions of national 
parliaments shall be submitted to the Union legislator, for 
consideration in the procedure: (a) before concluding the first reading, 
the co-legislators (the EP and the Council) shall consider whether the 
 
141. Id. at art. 6(1); Roberta Panizza, The Principle of Subsidiarity, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2018), europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-
principle-of-subisidiarity. 
142. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(1).  
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at art. 7(2).  
146. Id. The mechanism, by analogy with soccer jargon, has been defined as 
a yellow and not as a red card system. Jean-Victor Louis, National Parliaments 
and the Principle of Subsidiarity - Legal Options and Practical Limits, 4 EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. 429, 431 (2008). As Louis points out:  
Some members of the Convention had preferred the establishment of a 
red card system but this idea was discarded essentially in order to avoid 
infringing the monopoly of initiative of the Commission maintained as a 
principle in the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of the necessity for the 
Council to be unanimous in order to amend a proposal of the 
Commission.  
Id. at 438. 
147. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(3). That 
nickname comes from traffic lights, but it also keeps trace of its Dutch 
Government original proposal. It stresses the fact that “opinions of national 
parliaments are not sufficient in order to block the proposal”; Louis, supra note 
146, at 438.  
148. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(3). 
149. Id. 
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legislative proposal is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, 
taking particular account of the reasons expressed and shared by the 
majority of national parliaments as well as the reasoned opinion of 
the Commission; (b) if, by a majority of 55 percent of the members of 
the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the EP, the legislators 
are of the opinion that the proposal is not compatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given 
further consideration.150  
 It is likely to assume that the Member States’ and judicial 
control over the respect of the competences conferral to the EU 
would be more effective in the future, in spite of what happened so 
far. A significant argument for that may already be found in the 
German and Czech Constitutional Court’s (so-called) Lisbon 
Rulings, which held that every transfer of competences needs a 
clear “delimitation” of the transferred powers in order to allow the 
national parliaments to predict the degree to which competences are 
actually transferred to the EU.151 According to the latter, rather 
than address preliminary proceedings to the ECJ when in doubt 
about European law (as stated in the Treaties), both Constitutional 
Courts announced the will to keep their own authority to decide 
whether EU regulations are compatible with the “remaining 
national identity” of their sovereign countries.152 
 
1. National Parliaments and the Early Warning System 
 Since the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was 
signed in Rome in October 2004, national parliaments have had and 
played a very marginal role in the subsidiarity check during the EU 
law-making process.153 They could only be found with reference to 
ensuring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance 
with the procedure set out in the Protocol.154 They are also 
mentioned in Article I-18, where the EU Commission shall draw 
national parliaments’ attention to proposals for monitoring the 
 
150. Id.  
151. BVerfG, Judgement of the Second Senate of Jun. 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08,  
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html; Petr Bříza, The Czech 
Republic: The Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision of 26 
November 2008, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 143, 152 (2009). 
152. See THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S LISBON RULING: LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 45 (A. FISCHER-LESCANO, C. JOERGES 
& A. WONKA eds., 2010) (pointing out, “[i]n its ruling, the GCC gives itself the 
right to judge over ultra vires and sufficient remaining national identity. It is 
critical that it usurps itself this right, rather than announcing to address 
preliminary proceedings to the ECJ when in doubt about European law”). 
153. Louis, supra note 146, at 431; Jit Peters, National Parliaments and 
Subsidiarity: Think Twice, 1 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 68, 70 (2005).  
154. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-11(3), Oct. 29, 
2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 20.  
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subsidiarity principle.155  
 Further, the only reference to national parliaments in Title VI 
on “The Democratic Life of the Union” could be found in a provision 
on “Representative Democracy.”156 It mentions the democratic 
responsibilities of the heads of State or of Government, or 
governments (composing respectively the European Council and the 
Council) either to their national parliaments, or to their citizens.157 
On the one hand, the accent is on the control of the Governments as 
members of the Council, especially in the elaboration of EU 
legislation; on the other hand, it is on the active contribution of 
national parliaments to Union's affairs.  
 The Treaty of Lisbon now provides for a complement to the 
early warning system in the control of the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity in family law with cross-border 
implications,158 which introduces a new possibility for national 
parliaments to veto the use of a so-called “passerelle procedure” 
which, according to Article 48 TEU, allows the switch to a different 
kind of legislative procedure.159 
 Title II – “Democratic principles” – of the modified TEU 
includes a new Article 12 on the active contribution of national 
parliaments “to the good functioning of the Union.”160 They take 
 
155. Id. at art 1-18 at 24.  
156. Id. at art. 1-46 at 40.  
157. Id. 
158. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 81(3).  
159. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 48 states that,  
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Title V 
of this Treaty provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area 
or case, the European Council may adopt a decision authorising the 
Council to act by a qualified majority in that area or in that case. This 
subparagraph shall not apply to decisions with military implications or 
those in the area of defence. 
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for 
legislative acts to be adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, the European Council may adopt a decision 
allowing for the adoption of such acts in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure. 
Any initiative taken by the European Council on the basis of the first or 
the second subparagraph shall be notified to the national Parliaments. 
If a national Parliament makes known its opposition within six months 
of the date of such notification, the decision referred to in the first or the 
second subparagraph shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, 
the European Council may adopt the decision. 
For the adoption of the decisions referred to in the first and second 
subparagraphs, the European Council shall act by unanimity after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given 
by a majority of its component members. 
Id. 
160. Id. at art. 12.  
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part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation, among national 
parliaments, each other, and with the European Parliament.161 
National parliaments also get informed by having draft legislative 
acts of the Union forwarded to them (in accordance with the Protocol 
on the role of national parliaments in the EU) for checking whether 
the principle of subsidiarity is respected (in accordance with the 
procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality).162  
 Yet, the Commission keeps stating that the principle of 
subsidiarity is not being observed in an appropriate way.163 The 
2014 Commission’s Annual Report on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality stated that the reasoned opinions on alleged breach 
of the principle of subsidiarity received by the Commission from 
national parliaments in 2014 represented a decrease of 76% 
compared to the number of reasoned opinions received in the 
previous years.164 Further, the reasoned opinions received in 2014 
accounted for a considerably lower proportion (4%) of the overall 
number of opinions received by the Commission in the same year in 
the wider context of the political dialogue.165 The majority of 
national chambers thus issued one or no reasoned opinions.166 
 According to the decrease of reasoned opinions produced by 
national parliaments, one may think about a significant improving 
of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity by the EU institutions. 
However, the smaller number of reasoned opinions must be seen in 
the light of the decrease in the overall number of legislative 
proposals issued by the Commission towards the end of its term of 
office and not as an indication of an increased satisfaction by 
national parliaments in subsidiarity matters.167 As the Commission 
reports, “[a]lthough national parliaments were less active in terms 
of issuing reasoned opinions in 2014, a growing number of national 
chambers called for strengthening of the subsidiarity control 
procedure.”168 The Danish Folketing169, the Dutch Tweede 
 
161. Id. at art. 12 (f).  
162. Id. at art. 12 (a) and (b). 
163. Commission Annual Report 2014 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 
at 4, COM (2015) 315 final (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Commission 2014 Report].  
164. Id.  
165. Id.  
166. Id. at 5.  
167. Diane Fromage, Regional Parliaments and the Early Warning System: 
An Assessment Six Years After the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, Luiss 
School of Government, Working Paper Series 5 (2016).  
168. 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.  
169. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS COMM., DANISH PARLIAMENT, TWENTY-THREE 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN 
CHANGING EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE (2014). 
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Kamer,170 and the UK House of Lords171 submitted reports with 
ideas on how to extend the scope of subsidiarity control.172 “They 
suggested that reasoned opinions should not only concern 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance 
with the principle of proportionality or the legal basis for the 
proposal.”173 “The reports also advocated an extension of the 
deadline for submitting reasoned opinions and proposed that when 
a ‘yellow card’ is triggered, the Commission should be bound to 
withdraw or amend its proposal.”174  
 Since those provisions have a purely indicative value (and thus 
no normative value), they include different tools of intervention of 
national parliaments in the context of EU lawmaking. Those tools 
show how data on reasoned opinions are not reliable of a better 
satisfaction with the respect of the principle of subsidiarity on 
national parliaments’ side.175 
 Consistently, in 2016, the Commission kept practicing the 
Better Regulation agenda on assessing subsidiarity in the policy-
making process.176 Those guidelines, first adopted in 2015 and 
amended in 2017, require the Commission to carry out a 
subsidiarity analysis for every new both legislative and non-
legislative initiative or proposals in matters included in the sharing 
competence areas.177 According to the guidelines, the aim of the 
analysis is twofold: first, “to assess whether action at national, 
regional or local level is sufficient to achieve the objective pursued; 
second, to assess whether Union action would provide added value 
over action by the Member States.”178 
 When considering a new policy process, the Commission 
publishes a preliminary description of the envisaged initiative along 
with inception impact assessments, also including an initial 
justification as regards to subsidiarity.179 During the policy 
development process, subsidiarity aspects are analyzed through an 
open public consultation.180 The results are then submitted to the 
 
170. Dutch Tweede Kamer, Ahead in Europe: On the Role of the Tweede 
Kamer and National Parliaments in the EU, TWEEDE KAMER (May 9, 2014), 
www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/default/files/news_items/ahead_in_europ
e_tc m181-238660_0.pdf.  
171. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5; BRITISH HOUSE OF 
LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMM., THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (2014). 
172. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.  
173. Panizza, supra note 141. 
174. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.  
175. Panizza, supra note 141. 
176. Commission Staff Working Document on Better Regulation Guidelines, 
SWD (2017) 350 final (July 7, 2017).  
177. Id. 
178. Annual Report 2016 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 3, COM 
(2017) 600 final (June 30, 2017).  
179. Id. at 2. 
180. Id. 
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independent evaluation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.181 
Finally, the explanatory memorandum summarizes how the respect 
of the principle of subsidiarity is met.182 
 
2. The (Committee of the) Regions Bringing Legal Actions 
Before the Court of Justice 
 The expression “Europe of the Regions” has been used in the 
EU with a broad range of meanings.183 In general terms, “Region” 
refers to a geographic portion of land. However, in the European 
history, Regions have also assumed special features giving an area 
a distinct character from an economic perspective, or an 
administrative entity, or even a political body generating a feeling 
of identity – religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historic – among 
the inhabitants.184 Also their denomination varies widely: Lander 
(Germany), Regioni (Italy), Comunidades Autonomas (Spain), 
Regions (UK) are only some examples. 
 That concept basically means processes of regionalization or 
federalization, by which territorial entities (below the level of the 
nation state) have acquired a more autonomous status and wider 
authority within the nation state.185 For others, because the nation 
states are no longer capable of performing their tasks and functions 
properly, they have been substantially replaced by smaller 
territorial units (Regions) as the new basic component parts of the 
international system “beyond the nation state.”186 Whichever 
definition one may agree with, it seems that Regions count more 
than before in the EU legal system and form a separate level within 
its multi-level governance system.  
 There has been a general trend throughout Europe favoring 
the sub-national level over the past two to three decades, through 
the “top-down” or “bottom-up” regionalism.187 A number of reasons 
 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 3. 
183. Hrbek, supra note 127, at 59. 
184. Id. at 60. 
185. Thomas Vandamme, Still the Committee of ‘Legislative Regions’? On 
Heterogeneity, Representation and Functionality of the Committee of the Regions 
After 2004, AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR EUR. L. GOVERNANCE 9-10 (2013).  
186. See Jurgen Habermas, Beyond the Nation State?, 10 PEACE REV. 235, 
235-39 (2008) (explaining the changing development of nation-states as no 
longer being relied upon for their original functionality).  
187. See Hrbek, supra note 127, at 60-61 (pointing out, “[i]n the nineties, 
Belgium underwent a thorough state reform, transforming a centralist into a 
federal system; the new Belgian constitution, which entered into force in 1994, 
provides for Regions and Communities as sub-national territorial entities. The 
transformation in Spain (beginning in the late seventies) from an authoritarian 
regime to democracy was accompanied by the re-introduction of territorial units 
possessing particular powers and allowing for the emergence and consolidation 
of regional identity. Under the term ‘devolution’, the United Kingdom adopted 
a territorial structure (1998/99) by which Scotland and Wales were given their 
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may explain that trend. Solutions taken at state level, away from 
populations affected by them, are no longer regarded as appropriate 
because of their lack of democracy or legitimacy.188 Input from below 
is seen as necessary and in most cases, implementation is done at 
the lower level.189 This is especially true at the European level 
where population in smaller regions now asks for greater regional 
autonomy to escape from the big economic crisis, since market 
integration has increased disparities between different areas.190 
 The growing role of sub-national territorial entities in their 
nation-states have required a principle to guide the interaction 
between them and the wider EU legal system. It has been a 
practical necessity and reflects the growing role that the Committee 
of the Regions191 has been playing over the last few years, especially 
 
own institutions (a directly elected assembly and an executive accountable to 
this assembly) with genuine powers. France and Italy continue their 
developments towards regionalization and in an established federal system, like 
that of Germany, the Lander are trying to strengthen their position. Finally, 
one should not forget that processes of decentralization and formal 
regionalization have taken place in Central and Eastern European applicant 
countries”). 
188. See Art. 114, 117 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (defining legislative powers 
in Italy and the municipalities that make up the Republic).  
189. Id.  
190. See generally GIOVANI COINU, GIANMARIO DEMURO, FRANCESCO MOLA, 
La specialità sarda alla prova della crisi economica globale, EURAC, ESI, 2017 
(reporting the results of a survey showing that the best solution to exit the 
economic crisis that began in 2008 would be the request for greater autonomy 
from the National Government). In Italy, there are ongoing legislation proposals 
by Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna (the three richest regions in Italy) 
to obtain wider autonomy for managing schools, healthcare, and justice under 
the provision of Article 116.3 of the Italian Constitution: 
Additional special forms and conditions of autonomy, related to the areas 
specified in art. 117, paragraph three and paragraph two, letter l) - 
limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace - 
and letters n) and s), may be attributed to other Regions by State Law, 
upon the initiative of the Region concerned, after consultation with the 
local authorities, in compliance with the principles set forth in art. 119. 
Said Law is approved by both Houses of Parliament with the absolute 
majority of their members, on the basis of an agreement between the 
State and the Region concerned.  
Art. 116.2 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). See also Catalonia Crisis in 300 Words, 
BBC (June 11, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41584864 (showing a 
good example of legislative proposals to obtain wider autonomy. During the 
2017 Catalan Constitutional crisis in Spain, a referendum was held for getting 
the Catalan independency from the Government of Spain. Catalonia is the 
richest region in the country. The nationalist party won the referendum (and 
the subsequent regional elections in December 2017), but the Spanish 
Constitutional Court held that referendum illegal, notwithstanding 90% of 
Catalan people backed independence).  
191. Enrico Borghi, The Development of the Committee of the Regions, in 
GOVERNING EUROPE UNDER A CONSTITUTION 445 (Herm.-Josef Blanke & Stelio 
Mangiameli Mangiameli eds., 2006); Susana Boras-Alomar et al., Towards a 
Europe of the Regions? Visions and Reality form a Critical Perspective, 4 
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after the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
 At the beginning of the former European Economic Community 
it was already clear that regional policy at the European level would 
have had a relevant consistency, at least in terms of budgeting 
massive special development funds for the less developed areas.192 
That was probably the main reason for regional authorities to want 
to be directly involved in European policy-making.193 Some of the 
regions were already entitled with a high level of autonomy in their 
national states, where they could indeed exercise legislative 
authority. Thus, it is not surprising that German Lander and 
Belgians Communautés were the main advocates (where United 
Kingdom and France were instead opposed) for the 
institutionalization of the Committee of the Regions since the 
preparation of Treaty of Maastricht (1992).194 This is true, even 
though it was done with mere advisory powers and only in limited 
and specific areas of the whole EU legislative authority.195 With 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Committee’s power was 
strengthened by expanding the EU policy areas where its advisory 
opinion was mandatory.196 
 It was only with the Treaty of Lisbon that the Committee of the 
Regions was given a more significant role in the EU legislative 
process: on the one hand, through the further increasing of areas of 
mandatory consultation;197 on the other hand, through the right 
granted to the Committee to bring legal actions before the Court of 
 
REGIONAL POL. & POL’Y 1, 35-37 (1994). 
192. See History of the Policy, EUR. COMM’N, ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/policy/what/history/ (last visited May 1, 2019) (setting forth a timeline of the 
start of the European Economic Community). 
193. Peter Van Der Knaap, The Committee of the Regions: the Outset of a 
‘Europe of the Regions’?, 4 REGIONAL POL. & POL’Y 86 (1994).  
194. See Art. 117 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (noting, “Legislative powers shall 
be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and 
with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international 
obligations.”); Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 70(1) (explaining, “The 
Länder shall have the right to legislate insofar as this Basic Law does not confer 
legislative power on the Federation.”); 1994 Const. art. 127-133 (Belg.) (setting 
forth the responsibilities of the Communities); C.E., B.O.E. n. 143 , Dec. 29, 
1978 (Spain) (recognizing that when self-governance is implemented, 
“bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic 
characteristics, insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status 
may accede to self-government and form Self-governing Communities 
(Comunidades Autónomas) in conformity with the provisions contained in this 
Part and in the respective Statutes”).  
195. See Vandamme, supra note 185, at 13 (explaining the non-binding 
advice that was permitted to be put forth). 
196. Id. 
197. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 91 (Transport), art. 102 (Air 
Transport), art. 148 (Employment Policy), art. 153, art. 164 (European Social 
Fund), art. 165 (Education), art. 166 (Vocational Training), art. 167(5), art. 
168(4) (health care), art. 168(5), art. 172 (Trans European Networks), art. 175, 
art. 177 (Structural Funds), art. 178 (European Regional Development Fund), 
art. 192 (Environment), art. 194 (Energy).  
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Justice for protecting its prerogatives.198 In the past this same kind 
of privilege was given to the EP in the Treaty of Nice; thus some 
have pointed out that it is likely that, “in the future, the ECJ might 
opt for a broader legal interpretation of this right,” as it has already 
occurred with the EP.199 
 Some authors have pointed out that the EU is deeply 
characterized by a division of public authority alongside only two 
centers, the national and the supranational, and there is no room 
for interpreting subsidiarity as the tool by which “regional 
authorities are portrayed as […] active insiders to EU affairs.”200 In 
that given context, the Committee played a very marginal role on 
monitoring the subsidiarity principle.201 
 The higher role of the Committee after Lisbon is ensured by 
the new wording of Article 5.3 TEU which limits EU action if goals 
“cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States either at 
central or at regional and local level.”202 The Committee has always 
favored this wider notion of subsidiarity, and the Protocol No. 2, on 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
has finally accorded to the Committee the right to initiate direct 
subsidiarity review before the EU Court of Justice over EU 
legislative acts in areas of mandatory consultation.203 
 In the meantime, the Committee of the Regions adopted its 
second “Subsidiarity Work Programme” in 2014, which included 
selected initiatives according to specific criteria set in 
environmental policies.204 However, “several respondents raised 
concerns about proportionality, questioning the feasibility of the 
new...targets...and highlighting the different approaches... 
throughout the EU.”205 Several opinions adopted by the Committee 
of the Regions raised concerns in terms of compliance of 
Commission proposals with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.206 Since the Commission proposals are hard to 
change due to the complex bicameral legislative procedure of the 
EU, successful influence on the Commission often would meet the 
goal.207  
 The actual influence of the Committee of the Regions has been 
largely neglected.208 However, those opinions do often produce 
 
198. Id. at art. 263. 
199. Vandamme, supra note 185, at 15.  
200. Michèle Finck, Challenging the Subnational Dimensions of 
Subsidiarity in EU Law, 8 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 5, 13 (2015).  
201. Id.  
202. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5(3).  
203. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.  
204.Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 7.  
205. Id. at 8. 
206. Id. at 8-11.  
207. Id. at 12. 
208. Marco Brunazzo & Ekaterina Domorenok, New Members in Old 
Institutions: The Impact of Enlargement on the Committee of the Regions, 18 
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effects on policy-making, both on the addressee and the final policy 
outcome even though their recommendations are not binding.209 As 
some have pointed out, the actual influence of the Committee’s 
advisory opinions relies on a number of variables: first, it is more 
influential when the recommendation comes early in the formal 
decision-making process, if the addressee believes that the 
Committee has high expertise in the subject matter and only when 
its position is close to the own position of the addressee.210 Overall 
it is proven that the Committee exercises a stronger influence in the 
position of the addressee body than over the final policy outcome.211 
That is, it is more likely to have a positive effect on the final policy 
by influencing the initial position of the Commission, or the EP and 
the Member States, very early in the process since the Committee 
has no formal vote in the legislative procedure and it is excluded 
from political negotiations between the EP, the Council and the 
Commission.212 
 Protocol No. 2, however, now gives the Committee of the 
Regions a powerful tool for strengthening its own role as watchdog 
of the principle of subsidiarity acknowledging the Committee the 
right to bring legal action before the ECJ against legislative acts on 
which it was consulted.213 
 
3. The Enforceability of the Principle of Subsidiarity 
 The practical application of the principle of subsidiarity has 
been defined as “minimal”214 or “very timid”215 because it has “little 
value as a standard of scrutiny,”216 or “largely inoperable at the 
stage of adjudication,”217 or finally because subsidiarity is 
“essentially a political and subjective principle.”218 Subsidiarity has 
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been always perceived as a political or a pre-legislative principle 
instead of an actual legal and justiciable criterion for the allocation 
of law-making authorities in the EU.219 Thus, the ECJ has exercised 
little judicial review on it and many consider the failure of 
subsidiarity as a judicial review principle in se because the ECJ has 
adopted an excessively deferential approach to its judicial 
enforcement, despite its well-known general judicial activism.220  
 On the one hand, the ECJ has confirmed that subsidiarity does 
not create individual rights under the Treaties, as it solely relates 
to the division of powers between the Union and the Member 
States,221 and has also held that the principle of subsidiarity is 
justiciable (moving away from a previous contrary Advocate 
General’s Opinion in Germany v. Parliament and Council222). 
Nevertheless, the Court has never held, on the other hand, that any 
EU legislative act was invalid for the breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity.223 
 However, it is possible to find some major cases involving 
subsidiarity which have been decided before the Lisbon Treaty was 
entered into force.  
 In the Working Time Directive case, for example, the EU 
provided for minimum working time and wages throughout the 
Community.224 The United Kingdom argued that the legislator did 
not give any evidence of how those aims were better achieved at the 
Community level rather than at the national level.225 The ECJ’s 
decision, however, found it adequate because of the improvement of 
the level of health and safety protection for the workers.226 
 In the Deposit Guarantee case, the ECJ considered sufficient 
the very general reasons given in the recitals, because they showed 
the EU Parliament’s view for better achieving the goal at the 
Community level since the previous action at national level proved 
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insufficient. 227 
 In the Biotechnology case, the Court held that the 
consideration of subsidiarity was necessarily implicit since the 
different laws of the Member States, according to the need of the 
protection of biotechnology, were an obstacle to the internal EU 
market. 228 
 In the British American Tobacco case, the ECJ (examining for 
the first time the argument on a substantive rather than procedural 
grounds) held that the Directive did not go beyond what was 
necessary to ensure the harmonization of Member states laws 
regarding manufacture, presentation, and sale of tobacco products.  
229 
 It was only in the Vodafone230 and in the Airport Charges231 
cases that the EU regulation was expressly challenged for the 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity. In Vodafone, the EU “set a 
ceiling for both wholesale and retail charges” on mobile phone 
roaming, considering it necessary for improving the internal 
market.232 However, the Court, stated that the challenged 
provisions were consistent with subsidiarity.233 In the latter case, 
Luxembourg argued that the challenged Directive breached 
subsidiarity because it applied to situations that could be regulated 
at national level, but again, the ECJ upheld the Directive on the 
ground that Luxembourg had not alleged sufficient details to permit 
the Court to determine whether Member State laws would be 
adequate to achieve the aim of the Directive.234 
 Though the ECJ had already confirmed that the subsidiarity 
principle would still have been justiciable, the Lisbon Treaty and 
the annexed Protocol No. 2 wording nonetheless make it clear that 
subsidiarity is a judicially enforceable legal principle and give the 
right to bring legal action on the ground of a possible breach of it.235 
Yet, “defining at what level a task is better accomplished is primarily 
a political problem [and] it should therefore left to political 
process.”236  
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 Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 now expressly provides that 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction 
in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with the 
rules laid down in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union by Member States, or notified by them in 
accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national 
Parliament or a chamber thereof. In accordance with the rules laid 
down in the said Article, the Committee of the Regions may also 
bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of which 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides 
that it be consulted.237 
 On the one hand, the essential political value of the principle 
is clear, as subsidiarity has been confirmed, even in the Protocol 
wording. It provides, for instance, the right to bring legal action 
before the ECJ to the Member States, their national parliaments (or 
a chamber thereof) and the Committee of the Regions, which are 
obviously political institutions.238  
 One may observe that the Protocol does not actually give a 
direct right to bring judicial review proceedings for the breach of 
subsidiarity, but they only can do so through proceedings notified 
by the national government,239 and not all Member States regulate 
the process by positive law yet.240 One may also observe that the 
Committee of the Regions has to respect three pre-conditions in 
order to bring a legal action for the breach of subsidiarity.241 Yet, 
the Protocol expressly devolves, for the first time, to ECJ the judicial 
application of subsidiarity and it has already sorted some effects. 
For instance, the Commission withdrew a proposed regulation on 
collective action and the Committee of the Regions issued an opinion 
which stated that  
if the Commission had maintained its proposal . . . the Committee 
could have considered taking the necessary steps to lodge an ex-
post appeal against it for breaching the principle of subsidiarity in 
terms of both the choice of legal basis and insufficient evidence of 
the added value of EU action in this area.242 
 One may reasonably expect that the ECJ would bring a quali-
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quantitative approach in the judgments, according with Article 5 of 
the mentioned Protocol for evaluating whether a Union objective 
can be better achieved at Union level (instead of at State level) 
where both qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative 
indicators must be met.243 That may require the ECJ to develop a 
new justiciability test to review whether the principle of 
subsidiarity has been respected or not.  
 Should we expect a new era of subsidiarity case-law? The ECJ 
has already given proof of its ability to manage vague legal concepts, 
making it possible for the EU to move toward a higher standard of 
multilevel constitutionalism.244 ECJ case-law had lead the 
European integration, making it possible for the EU legal system to 
improve its legal nature. The ECJ has explicitly recognized the 
relevance of internal federal arrangements for the application of EU 
law.245 Accordingly, even the “free movement principle”246 is not 
recognized as absolute, but it has to be balanced with the need to 
guarantee certain national public aims without the need of making 
any reference to the principle of subsidiarity.247  
 The wording of Article 8 of the Protocol No. 2 now enhances the 
role of the Court, the national parliaments, and the Committee of 
the Regions, and they have already shown their appreciation for the 
opportunity to play a major role in the subsidiarity check process.248 
 The main objections to a stronger judicial enforcement of 
subsidiarity, as related to the ECJ, would be at “a comparative 
disadvantage in relation to the Union institutions in terms of 
legitimacy, resources, and competence.”249 According to its case-law 
however, the Court could positively strengthen the judicial review 
through a rigorous check on adequate reasoning along with relevant 
evidence which justified the EU legislative intervention rather than 
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nation-states.250 The toolbox now seems to be adequate: impact 
assessments, explanatory memorandum, reports from national 
parliaments and Committee of the Regions, and amendments to the 
legislative proposal deriving from the EU institutions give the 
Court the chance to consider whether there is adequate evidence 
and reasoning to sustain the exercise of EU competence or not.  
 
B. Trilogues and Subsidiarity, A Case Study: The 
Amendment of Directive 96/71 on Posting of 
Workers 
 The Annual Report 2016 Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
identified 65 opinions from national parliaments discussing 
subsidiarity.251 That number is seven times higher than opinions 
raised in 2015, showing the increased interest by the Member 
States on the new checking subsidiarity mechanism.252 
 Whether the new early warning system along with the 
Commission’s guidelines will be effective tools providing national 
parliaments with a stronger and proactive role is yet to be proven.253 
Some are rather skeptical, putting in doubt the practical 
importance of the new powers on subsidiarity given to national 
parliaments: they claim that the procedure created by the Protocol 
is not the better way for national parliaments to make their voice 
heard in the Union.254 A better guarantee for due respect of the 
subsidiarity would “have been a requirement of an extra qualified 
majority... within the Council and the European Parliament, in case 
the national parliaments object on account of subsidiarity”255 or 
introducing a so-called “green card” for allowing national 
parliaments to propose new policies or legislation to the 
Commission, including amending or repealing the existing EU 
laws.256 
 A leading case is going to be the Commission’s amending 
proposal of Directive 96/71 on posting of workers in 2016, since the 
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more recent “yellow card” was triggered against that.257 As 
stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and reinforced 
by the case-law of the ECJ, the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services guarantee the mobility of businesses 
and professionals within the EU.258 However, with regard to the 
posting of workers, as a specific type of cross-border labor mobility, 
there is a need to balance internal market freedoms with measures 
guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers.259 Currently, the 
1996 Directive on the posting of workers is being revised to address 
unfair practices experienced during its implementation where the 
internal market freedoms have prevailed over the social rights of 
workers.260 
 In the years following the adoption of that Directive, the 
implementation, legal interpretation, and regulation of the special 
case of posted workers exposed three specific challenges. Firstly, a 
widening gap of wage differentials between Member States created 
adverse incentives: labor cost differentials between countries with 
the highest and lowest minimum wage levels, have changed from a 
factor of 1:3 in 1999 to 1:10 in 2015.261 As wage gaps continue to 
widen, and the overall labor costs continue to diverge between 
countries, there is an increasing financial incentive, based on wage 
competition, for businesses to use posted workers.262 This incentive 
is seen in practice with a 44.4% increase in the number of postings 
between 2010 and 2014.263 
 Secondly, legal uncertainties and regulatory loopholes 
facilitated malpractices: the Directive does not set out clear criteria 
to define the temporary nature of work or what constitutes a 
genuine posting from an ‘established’ firm in a Member State to an 
undertaking in a host Member State.264 These ambiguities have led 
to many concerns about the potential misuse of the Directive to 
circumvent employment and social security legislation through 
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various loopholes such as rotational posting and letter-box 
companies.265 
 Thirdly,  
[i]n view of the social policy provisions introduced into the 
European Treaties since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty revision, it is 
questionable whether the 1996 Directive provides an adequate 
legal instrument for ensuring a level playing field for free cross-
border service provision while at the same time delivering an 
adequate foundation for the social rights of workers. In cases 
where the Directive leaves implementation and enforcement of 
minimum standards of employment to Member States, it relies on 
Court of Justice rulings to interpret the terminology in the 
Directive. However, rulings since the adoption of the Directive 
have not provided the necessary legal clarity. […] In addition, with 
its four judgments in 2007/2008 in the cases Viking (C-438/05), 
Laval (C-341/05), Rüffert (C-346/06) and Commission vs. 
Luxembourg (C-319/06), the Court of Justice has turned the 
employment standards originally conceived as minimum 
standards in the Directive into a ‘maximum ceiling’ of terms and 
conditions of employment. In the meantime, though, the Court has 
issued two judgments with a more protective effect for posted 
workers: in the Sähköalojen ammattiliittory case (C-396/13), it 
ruled that categorizing workers in different pay groups which are 
universally binding and transparent in a collective agreement has 
to also be applied to posted workers. More recently, it ruled in the 
Regio-Post case (C-115/14), that Member States can require 
tenderers of public procurements and their subcontractors to pay 
their employees a set minimum wage.266 
 According to its own political guidelines promoting the 
principle, “the same work at the same place should be remunerated 
in the same manner,” and the Commission thus adopted a 
proposal267 for a targeted revision of the Directive on posting of 
workers.268 The purpose was to ensure that the implementation of 
the freedom to provide services in the Union would guarantee, at 
the same time, a level playing field for businesses and respect for 
the rights of workers.269 According to the proposal, all mandatory 
rules on remuneration in the host Member State should be applied 
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to workers posted to that Member State.270  
 The Commission proposal elicited fourteen reasoned opinions 
from national parliaments in eleven Member States.271 According to 
the Commission, these reasoned opinions represent “22 out of a total 
of 56 votes, more than one-third of the total, thereby triggering the 
procedure of the early warning under Article 7(2) of Protocol No. 2 
to the Treaties (the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure).”272 National 
parliaments pointed out “(i) that existing rules were sufficient and 
adequate, (ii) that the Union was not the adequate level of the 
action, (iii) that the proposal fails to recognize explicitly Member 
States' competences on remuneration and conditions of employment 
and, (iv) that the proposal's justification with regard to the principle 
of subsidiarity was too succinct.”273 
 In the auspice of improving the interaction with national 
Parliaments, the Commission engaged directly with national 
Parliaments and adopted a Communication concluding that since 
“the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity it should 
be maintained unchanged.”274
 
In its Communication, while 
explaining why the rules in place are not sufficient and adequate to 
achieve that objective, the Commission recalled that “posting, by 
definition is of a cross-border nature” and workers carrying out 
work at the same location have to be protected by the same 
mandatory rules, irrespective of whether they are local or posted 
workers.275 The Communication furthermore confirms the respect 
of the Member States’ competences to set remuneration and 
conditions of employment, in accordance with national laws and 
practice.276 Finally, the Communication addressed the question of 
justification of the proposal's compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, recalling the case-law of the Court of Justice and 
referring to the explanatory memorandum and the Impact 
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Assessment Report.277 
 This case is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, it is a 
good example of national parliaments’ understanding and use of the 
early warning system as a tool for going beyond the subsidiarity 
scrutiny.278 It is worth noting that the national parliaments’ 
understanding is founded on a substantial political basis.279 Second, 
it is meaningful that the Commission maintained the original 
proposal on exclusive procedural subsidiarity terms rather than the 
political matters addressed by national parliaments.280 
 Authors have pointed out some significant aspects of this third 
yellow card. First, the reasoned opinions come from a well-defined 
territorial area corresponding to ten Eastern European countries 
who joined the EU after 2004 enlargement.281 Second, in this 
specific case, the reasoned opinions presented are equal to the 
political position already expressed by their Governments in the 
Council during the co-legislative procedure.282 Finally, the reasoned 
opinions are founded on a solid nationalistic basis to keep minimum 
wages available for the (eastern) workers posted in the western and 
wealthier countries.283 
 What it is really remarkable, however, is the third reason of 
interest. For the first time ever, the debate about subsidiarity 
crossed what is proving to be the major (although informal) 
innovation in the law-making process in the EU institutional 
history: trilogue agreements.  
 Trilogues are tripartite meetings, that is informal negotiations 
on legislative proposals between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission 
aimed at reaching early agreements on new EU legislation. 
 After the Commission held to maintain its proposal for the 
revision of the Directive on posted workers, the inconsistent 
positions of the EP and the Council suggested starting an informal 
tripartite negotiation aimed to find a compromise agreement in the 
first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure.284 
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 In the Parliament’s files, it is clear its focus on the Directive’s 
revision is strengthening the commitment to guarantee a common 
set of social rights in order to avoid unfair treatment by extending 
the legal basis to the wider provision of Article 153 TFEU (EU social 
policies) instead of keeping it under the freedom of services 
regulation principles.285  
 Its negotiating mandate286 was adopted by the plenary on 
October 23, 2017 and includes some change requests to the 
Commission proposal.287 The Council commitment has indeed two 
core revisions at the heart of its general approach, coming after a 
troubled EU Ministers meeting (which witnessed a total France 
defeat) aimed to reach a broad support in order to have a stronger 
 
Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies - PE 607.346 (Oct., 2017), 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607346/IPOL_BRI(2017)
607346_EN.pdf (discussing the introduction of the use of the trilogues).  
285. European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 on Improving the 
Functioning of the European Union Building on the Potential of the Lisbon 
Treaty, 2014/2249 (INI).  
286. European Parliament Press Release, Posting of Workers: EP Ready to 
Start Negotiations with Member States (Oct. 25, 2017), www.europarl. 
europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171020IPR86571/posting-of-workers-ep-
ready-to-start-negotiations-with-member-states reports. After Council’s 
decision to start the trilogue also the plenary of the Parliament decided over the 
Employment Committee’s mandate proposal to trigger negotiations. The 
rapporteurs for the issue at stake are Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (EPP, FR) 
and Agnes Jongerius (S&D, NL) who declared, 
now that Council is ready to join the European Parliament at the 
negotiating table, we are very eager to finalise a Posting of Workers 
Directive that is up to date and fit for purpose. Things are moving in the 
right direction, but the devil is in the details. We will pay particular 
attention to the road transport issue, to make sure that the revision 
strikes the right balance between the freedom to provide services and 
better protecting workers.  
Id.  
287. See European Parliament Press Release, Posted Worker: Better 
Protection and Fair Conditions For All, (Oct. 16, 2017) www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/press-room/20171016IPR86114/posted-workers-better-protection-and-
fair-conditions-for-all (summarizing Parliament’s amendments requests as 
follows: a) “all of the host country’s rules on remuneration, set by law or 
collective agreements, should apply to posted workers,” and, “[m]ember States 
should be obliged to publish all elements of their national remuneration policy, 
as well as information on collective agreements, on a special website”; b) 
Parliament has extended the conditions of employment posted workers enjoy on 
a par with workers in the host state to the conditions of workers’ accommodation 
and allowance rates to cover travel, board and lodging expenses for workers 
away from their habitual place of work; c) “host[ing] Member States could opt 
to apply regional or sectorial collective agreements, instead of national ones, if 
they offer more favorable conditions for posted workers”; and d) the 
Commission’s presumption on long-term posting is being taken up, subject to 
the possibility to grant extensions to undertakings based on a reasoned request 
made to the competent authority of the Member State where the worker is 
posted).  
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mandate for the trilogue.288 
 One of the main areas of confrontation during trilogues will be 
the refusal by the Council to put the directive under article 153 of 
the EU treaty, as required by the Parliament.289 The Council wants 
a text aiming at the good functioning of internal market while the 
Parliament is eager to protect workers.290 
 EU employment commissioner Marianne Thyssen said that 
“there are always differences at the start of trilogue negotiations, 
but that the institutions will sit together, exchange views and try to 
convince each other to find a good positive compromise.”291 
 Tripartite interinstitutional negotiations (trilogues) between 
the Commission, Parliament and Council have started with the 
hopes of reaching a first-reading agreement.292 
 
C. Trilogues: Early Informal Negotiation at any Stage 
of the Decision-Making Process 
 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council has been able to 
adopt a legislative act at first reading if it approves all the 
amendments contained in the European Parliament’s opinion.293 
This formal provision has offered an informal space that decision-
makers could (but need not) choose to fill.294 
 The word trilogues appeared for the first time in the 2007 Joint 
Declaration by the three mentioned institutions on practical 
arrangements for the codecision procedure.295 The declaration 
 
288. Council of the European Union Press Release, Posting of Workers: 
Council Reaches Agreement (Oct. 24, 2017) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2017/10/24/posting-of-workers-council-reaches-agreement/. 
(reporting the Council found an agreement on reducing the possible length of 
postings from 24 months (as proposed by the Commission) to 12 months with a 
possibility of a 6-month extension). Further, the Council is not going as far as 
Parliament in only applying universally applicable collective agreements to 
posted workers across all sectors. Id.  
289. See Caterina Tani, EU Posted Workers Face Hurdles, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 
25, 2017), euobserver.com/social/139625 (reporting on the negotiations to agree 
on the directive).  
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. After the trilogue, the EP and the Council eventually adopted in the 
first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure the Directive (EU) 2018/957 
on 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services. Directive (EU) 2018/957of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, 2018 O.J (L 173) 16, 
data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/957/oj.  
293. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294. 
294. Michael Shackleton & Tapio Raunio, Codecision Since Amsterdam: A 
Laboratory for Institutional Innovation and Change, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 171, 
173-74 (2003).  
295. Joint Declaration, 2007/C 145/02, Joint Declaration on Practical 
Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty), 2007 
O.J. (C 145) 5, 6. 
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stated that the current practice (involving talks between the 
Council Presidency, the Commission and the chairs of the relevant 
committees, and/or rapporteurs of the European Parliament, and 
between co-chairs of the Conciliation Committee) “has proved its 
worth”296 and must “be encouraged.”297 General principle no. 7 
states that 
Cooperation between the institutions in the context of codecision 
often takes the form of tripartite meetings (‘trilogues’). This trilogue 
system has demonstrated its vitality and flexibility in increasing 
significantly the possibilities for agreement at first and second 
reading stages, as well as contributing to the preparation of the work 
of the Conciliation Committee.298 
 The Declaration confirms that such trilogues are usually 
conducted in an informal framework but then it tries to make them 
more formal, introducing some general rules related to any stage of 
the ordinary legislative procedure where the trilogues may be 
held.299 It is noteworthy that they have been subject to increasing 
degrees of formalization, leading to binding norms over time.300 
 
296. Id. at General Principles n. 1. 
297. Id. at General Principles n. 2. 
298. Id. at General Principles n. 7.  
299. Id. at Part II (Information). 
300. Christilla Roederer-Rynning & Justin Greenwood, The Culture of 
Trilogues, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1148, 1149-50 (2015). The authors point out,  
A first attempt to regulate the procedure took place in 2004 with the 
adoption of non-binding EP Guidelines for First and Second Reading 
Agreements (European Parliament 2004), though to little avail. 
Committees continued to display a patchwork of different practices, often 
leaving rapporteurs considerable freedom to make deals. This raised 
‘serious concerns … about the potential lack of transparency and 
democratic legitimacy inherent in the first reading negotiations, but also 
about the quality of the adopted legislation. In 2007, a Working Party for 
Parliamentary Reform set up by the Conference of Presidents advocated 
a more detailed set of rules. These were adopted as the EP’s Code of 
Conduct in 2008 and annexed to the EP’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) in 
2009 (European Parliament 2008). However, the code did little to ease 
the tide of criticism owing to its lack of binding status. In 2011, the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, at the request of the Conference of 
Presidents, drafted recommendations to give a legal status to the Code 
provisions. This new wave of reform led to the revision of Rule 70 (now 
73) of the RoP on ‘Interinstitutional negotiations in legislative 
procedures,’, which incorporated key provisions of the Code into the 
Rules and introduced the possibility of making the opening of trilogue 
negotiations conditional upon a mandate delivered by the EP’s Plenary 
(Rule 70a, now 74).  
The 2011 revisions also involved specification of the composition of the 
EP negotiating team and their obligations for reporting back during the 
course of trilogue negotiations. The chair or designated vice-chair 
nominee and the shadow rapporteurs and/or political group coordinators 
(or designated alternative) of the lead committee became de jure 
members of the EP negotiating team besides the rapporteur. Negotiators 
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 Since their first appearance, trilogues have developed in 
practice from the need of the two branches of the legislature to 
manage their interdependence.301 Such inter-institutional 
negotiations have now become standard practice for the adoption of 
EU legislative acts. In 2014, around ninety percent of EU laws were 
passed at first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure,302 with 
research by the Parliament estimating that the average law agreed 
at first reading takes seventeen months from start to finish.303 
 The EU Treaties already contain detailed rules governing the 
conciliation procedure between the co-legislators.304 In the ordinary 
legislative procedure, Article 294 of the TFEU inserted the so-called 
conciliation procedure before the third reading of the decision-
making process.305 The aim was precisely to find a solution when 
the positions of the Parliament and the Council had proved to be 
irreconcilable in the first two readings. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
therefore introduced into the community law a conciliation 
procedure that would allow a joint solution to be reached to 
overcome the paralysis determined by the opposing and 
irreconcilable positions of the main bodies of the European Union.306 
 A conciliation committee, composed of an equal number of 
members of the Parliament and Council representatives, is 
convened if the Council does not approve all of the Parliament's 
amendments at the second reading.307 If the committee does not 
agree on a joint text, the legislative act is not adopted, and the 
 
are required to report back to the Committee after each trilogue meeting, 
with opportunities to report back to their political group, for the renewal 
of a mandate. Meanwhile, the political groups themselves also observe 
the trilogue negotiations directly. Where there is no scheduled meeting 
of the Committee to report back to, the Committee chair is required to 
convene a meeting of the designated political coordinators within each 
committee. 
 Id. 
301. See id. (developing a whole picture on cultural institutionalization of 
trilogues). 
302. Gianni Pittella et al., Activity Report on Codecision and Conciliation: 
7th parliamentary term 14 July 2009-30 June 2014 (7th Parliamentary Term), 
www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/859059d1-8a65-4f20-a17a-
6c2baa7984aa/activity_report_2009_2014_en.pdf (last accessed May 23, 2019). 
[hereinafter 14 July 2009 Activity Report].  
303. Id. That trend is confirmed by EU Vice-Presidents responsible for 
Conciliation. Activity Report on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 4 July 2014- 
31 December 2016 (8th parliamentary term), DV\111217EN, www.epgencms. 
europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/7c368f56-983b-431e-a9fa-643d609f86b8/
Activity-report-ordinary-legislative-procedure-2014-2016-en.pdf. 
304. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 10-12.  
305. Id.  
306. Id.  
307. Id. at ¶ 10. See also European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th 
Parliamentary term, January 2017, Section 3, Interinstitutional negotiations 
during the ordinary legislative procedure where negotiations are specifically 
provided in different stages of the ordinary legislative procedure.  
300 UIC John Marshall Law Review [52:257 
procedure is ended.308 If a joint text is agreed, that text is forwarded 
to the Parliament and the Council for a third reading, and the 
wording of the joined text cannot be changed by the two 
institutions.309 
 The codecision procedure became the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ of the EU with the Treaty of Lisbon and has been the 
subject of a number of adaptations during its relatively short 
history.310 The formal process by which agreement is reached has 
proved to be, however, complex and time-consuming. It involves, 
potentially, multiple stages of deliberations and votes. Formal 
meetings between the co-legislators (carried out in a “Conciliation 
Committee”) can occur, but only after the second reading, at the 
very end of the process.311 This can make for a lengthy and difficult 
process. 
 In the post-Lisbon Treaty era, in which lawmakers are actively 
encouraged to go faster in agreeing on legislation, the conciliation 
process has been almost eliminated in recent years.312 In the 1999-
2004 term, eighty-nine of the four hundred EU legislative acts were 
completed after conciliation.313 In the first half of the current term, 
the figure was down to zero because there have been no conciliation 
procedures yet.314 This is the first time it has been zero since the 
Treaty of Maastricht and it is “one of the most distinctive legislative 
features of the current parliamentary term so far, it is not wholly 
unexpected, given the trend over recent years towards more early 
agreements between the co-legislators.”315  
 Despite the conciliation procedure, trilogues enable the co-
legislators to reach agreement at any stage of the legislative 
procedure, once the Commission has presented a proposal, even 
with no express reference in the EU Treaties.316 If the negotiations 
are successful, a compromise text is presented to the plenary of 
 
308. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 12. 
309. Id. at ¶ 13. 
310. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 123 (explaining that the co-
decision procedure led to “[t]he most significant increase in the power of the 
EP”).  
311. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 10. 
312. See generally Antonio Tajani et al., Activity Report on the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure 4 July 2014-31 December 2016 (8th Parliamentary Term), 
www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/7c368f56-983b-431e-a9fa-
643d609f86b8/Activity-report-ordinary-legislative-procedure-2014-2016-en.pdf 
(last accessed May 23, 2019) (pointing out the lack of conciliation during the 
period of the report).  
313. Pittella et al., supra note 302.  
314. Tajani et al., supra note 312, at Foreword. 
315. Id. 
316. See European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary term, 
January 2017, Section 3, Interinstitutional negotiations during the ordinary 
legislative procedure [hereinafter Parliament Rules of Procedure] (setting forth 
where negotiations are specifically provided in different stages of the ordinary 
legislative procedure). 
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Parliament and the Council.317 If each co-legislator formally 
approves the compromise text, it becomes law.318 
 According to Reh, trilogues differ from the EU’s formal 
legislative procedure mainly in four ways.319 “First, membership in 
trilogues is restricted and non-codified. […] Trilogues involve a 
limited group of actors, and the boundaries of participation are 
neither codified nor publicly known.”320 People attending trilogues 
may vary from file to file. Each institution designates its negotiators 
and defines its negotiating mandate.321 Trilogues may be organized 
at any stage of the legislative procedure (first, second or third 
reading) and any provisional agreement reached in trilogues is 
informal and has therefore to be approved by the formal procedures 
applicable within each of the two institutions.322  
 The Parliament reformed its Rules of Procedure in 2017, 
introducing Section 3, entitled Interinstitutional negotiations 
during the ordinary legislative procedure, where general rules on 
negotiations at any stage of the ordinary legislative procedure were 
provided.323 In the Parliament, for example, Rule 69f(1) states that 
“Parliament's negotiating team shall be led by the rapporteur and 
shall be presided over by the Chair of the committee responsible or 
by a Vice-Chair designated by the Chair. It shall at least consist of 
the shadow rapporteurs from each political group that wishes to 
participate.”324 The trilogue’s format, however, remains the same: 
together with Parliament’s negotiation team, “around the table are 
officials from the European Commission and either the minister or 
senior civil servants from the country holding the EU Council 
presidency.”325  
 “Second, trilogues are secluded, and their seclusion has neither 
been formally decided nor publicly justified. Access is highly 
restrictive and information on the decision-process is limited to 
feedback given by negotiators to their respective committees, and 
documentation on the decision-process is not publicly available.”326 
 
317. See European Parliament, Ordinary Legislative Procedure - 
Interinstitutional negotiations for the adoption of EU Legislation, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/ordinary-legislative-procedure/en/interinstitutional-
negotiations.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure] (outlining the approval process for the compromise text). 
318. Id.  
319. Christine Reh, Is Informal Politics Undemocratic? Trilogues, Early 
Agreements and the Selection Model of Representation, 21 J. EUR. PUBL POL’Y 
822, 825 (2014). 
320. Id.  
321. Id. at 828. 
322. Ordinary Legislative Procedure, supra note 317.  
323. European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary term, 
January 2017. 
324. Id. at rule 69f(1). 
325. Benjamin Fox, Secret EU Lawmaking: The Triumph of the Trilogues, 
EUOBSERVER (Apr. 4, 2014), euobserver.com/investigations/123555.  
326. Reh, supra note 319, at 825. 
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The participants are invariably armed with four-columned 
documents representing the starting position of the three 
institutions, with the fourth column left for the compromise text 
that is meant to emerge.327 According to Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure, “[a]ny document intended to be discussed at a meeting 
with the Council and the Commission (‘trilogue’) shall be circulated 
to the negotiating team at least 48 hours or, in cases of urgency, at 
least 24 hours in advance of that trilogue.”328 The Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure also state,  
After each trilogue, the Chair of the negotiating team and the 
rapporteur shall, on behalf of the negotiating team, report back to the 
next meeting of the committee responsible. Where it is not feasible to 
convene a meeting of the committee in a timely manner, the Chair of 
the negotiating team and the rapporteur shall, on behalf of the 
negotiating team, report back to a meeting of the committee 
coordinators.329  
 “Third, the rules specifying what is ‘requested, prohibited, or 
permitted’ in trilogues are informal; as such, they are ‘created, 
communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned 
channels.”330 Specifically, Parliament’s Rule 69f(4) reads, 
If negotiations lead to a provisional agreement, the committee 
responsible shall be informed without delay. Documents reflecting 
the outcome of the concluding trilogue shall be made available to the 
committee responsible and shall be published. The provisional 
agreement shall be submitted to the committee responsible, which 
shall decide, by way of a single vote by a majority of the votes cast, 
whether to approve it. If approved, it shall be tabled for consideration 
by Parliament, in a presentation which clearly indicates the 
modifications to the draft legislative act.331 
 Since former Rule 70 (2013) generally stated that “documents 
reflecting the outcome of the last trilogue shall be made available to 
the committee,” one may pay attention on how much room has been 
taken away from the informality of the whole process, at least at the 
Parliament’s ground.332 
 “Finally, the political process cannot be concluded in the 
informal arena; any agreement reached in trilogue is intermediate 
 
327. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1158.  
328. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(2).  
329. Id. at Rule 69f(3).  
330. Reh, supra note 319, at 825 (quoting Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the 
Study of Institutions, 48 PUB. CHOICE 3 (1986)); Gretchen Helmke & Steven 
Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, 
2 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 725 (2004).  
331. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(4). 
332. European Parliament, Amendment of Rule 70 on interinstitutional 
negotiations in legislative, Rule 70(2b) (Nov. 20, 2012), www.europarl.europa.eu
/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0422+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
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until formalized by the EP’s plenary and a Council meeting.”333  
 There is a clear benefit to reaching an early deal. This avoids 
the legislative proposal going back around the Parliament and 
Council for a second or even a third reading, which can add years to 
the decision-making process.  
 However, trilogues are problematic from a democratic 
perspective: they are secluded; involve a restricted number of 
participants selected according to unclear criteria; and produce 
intermediary outcomes that have to be sanctioned by formal 
decision-making processes. Scholars and professionals have 
inquired if trilogues weaken the democracy and transparency of the 
EU law-making procedure and, definitely, of the EU action.334 
 The core issue is about the democratic accountability of 
trilogues. As the EU Ombudsman pointed out: 
In a representative democracy, citizens elect representatives to act on 
their behalf in decision-making processes, most importantly, in the 
process of making laws. Citizens then hold their representatives to 
account for how they perform, most notably at elections. This applies 
equally to Members of the European Parliament […] and to Member 
States’ Ministers (who can be held to account through national 
elections or via their national Parliaments). […] The legislative 
process in a representative democracy therefore requires, if the 
representative democracy is to function properly, a high level of 
transparency.335 
 According to that, European citizens, businesses, and 
organizations should be able to follow each stage of the law-making 
procedure and to understand how the negotiators arrive at the 
endpoint, because the Treaties provide for legislating as openly as 
possible to maintain public trust.  
 In 2015 such critical issues went under the attention of the 
European Ombudsman, who opened an investigation focused on the 
right balance between the public interest in transparency and the 
public interest in an effective and efficient legislative process.336 As 
 
333. Reh, supra note 319, at 826. 
334. Hans-Joachim Lauth, Informal Governance and Democratic Theory, in 
INT’L HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE, 40-64 (Thomas Christiansen & 
Christine Neuhold, eds. 2012); Anne Rasmussen & Christine Reh, The 
Consequences of Concluding Codecision Early: Trilogues and Intra Institutional 
Bargaining Success, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1006-24 (2013); Reh, supra note 319, 
at 837 (2014); Christopher Lord, The Democratic Legitimacy of Codecision, 20 
JUR. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1056-73 (2013); ANNE ELIZABETH STIE, DEMOCRATIC 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU, TECHNOCRACY IN DISGUISE? (Routledge 2013).  
335. European Ombudsmen, Decision of the European Ombudsman setting 
out proposals following her strategic inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the 
transparency of Trilogues ¶¶ 15-16 (Jul. 12, 2016), www.ombudsm an.europa.eu 
/en/decision/en/69206 [hereinafter OI/8/2015/JAS]; see also Sweden and Turco v 
Council, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, ¶ 46 (stating the ability of EU 
citizens “to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a 
precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic rights”). 
336. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶ 68. 
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a result, the Ombudsman identified three core issues institutions 
have to face for making trilogues more respondent to the democratic 
principle. They are all related to the transparency of trilogues that 
arise for citizens: “citizens need to know if trilogue negotiations are 
taking place on a legislative proposal; they need general 
information about the content of those negotiations; and they need 
to know who is taking part in the negotiations.”337 
 The Ombudsman made also a list of her own proposals to 
Parliament, Council, and Commission to solve the critical issues of 
the trilogue agreements,338 generally based on an improved 
circulation of information about trilogues agenda and participants, 
along with a wider document availability.339  
 
D. Trilogues and the Separation of Powers in the EU 
 It would be of great interest to investigate if an actual 
separation of powers is really provided in the EU legal context, 
whether in the Treaties or in the daily practice of the EU. Also, it 
would be worth inquiring whether trilogues exist because there is 
separation of powers or, by contrast, because that separation is not 
part of the very nature of EU legal system.340 
 What seems more relevant for the purpose of this article, 
however, is how trilogues are shaping the institutional 
relationships between the Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission. Since trilogues appeared, it is indeed possible to see 
 
337. Id. at ¶ 32.  
338. It is worth noting that the EU institutions presented a united front 
against the Ombudsman, challenging the admissibility of her inquiry. They 
argued that the organizational aspects of the legislative procedure fall outside 
of her mandate because the way these meetings are organized pertain to the 
Council’s and the Parliament’s political responsibilities as the EU co-legislators, 
and not to their administrative activity. 
339. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335 (proposing that the institutions: “[1)] 
make proactively available, before trilogue negotiations begin, their positions 
on the Commission proposal; [2)] make available general summary agendas 
before or shortly after trilogue meetings; [3)] make proactively available four-
column documents, including the final agreed text, as soon as possible after the 
negotiations have been concluded; [4)] include, in legislative databases and 
calendars covering trilogues, links to any minutes or videos of the institutions’ 
public meetings where a trilogue has been discussed; [5)] make proactively 
available a list of the representatives who are politically responsible for 
decisions taken during a Trilogue, such as the MEPs involved, the responsible 
Minister from the Council Presidency and the Commissioner in charge of the 
file. If the power to take decisions is delegated to civil servants, their identities 
should also be disclosed proactively; [6)] make available as far as possible lists 
of documents tabled during trilogue negotiations; [7)] to work together to make 
as much trilogue information and documentation as possible publicly available 
through an easy-to-use and easy-to-understand joint database”). 
340. Those relevant issues are worthy to be deeply analyzed in the wider 
joint research program with the Center for International Law at the UIC John 
Marshall Law School mentioned at footnote n. 1. 
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an evolution of the roles respectively played by the three 
institutions in the legislative process.  
 Some believe that trilogues have been upgraded to the rank of 
institutionalized tools, because they “have moved away from being 
simple technical devices for managing the interdependence of the 
co-legislators, to become cultural constructs crystallizing different 
conceptions of institutional design” of the EU institutions.341 
 Institutionalization of trilogues brought some critical changes. 
On the one hand, it resulted in a classification of different kind of 
trilogue meetings; on the other, it significantly changed the 
Parliament’s and Council’s weighted powers in the legislative 
procedure.342  
 Trilogues originally emerged as a means to facilitate the 
‘conciliation procedure’ envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), 
which obliged the Council and Parliament to meet (subject to strict 
institutional requirements) in order to reach an agreement.343  
 The Council soon learned the new realities of being a co-
legislator, in that Parliament would veto any attempt by the 
Council to reintroduce its common position.344 The Council 
understood that legislative efficiency under codecision required 
early inter-institutional confidence-building measures.345 As 
Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood observe “[s]ince the early days of 
codecision, trilogues have become the way of making EU laws after 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) making it possible for EU legislation 
to be passed at first reading, [...] thereby extending their use beyond 
that of the very conciliation procedure.”346  
 In the beginning of trilogues era, the Council seemed to play a 
stronger role during informal negotiation phases.347 Its superior 
organization adaptation, the chance to get much more information, 
and the expertise of national administrations made it easy for the 
Council to play a very influential role in early trilogues.348 The 
Parliament was instead a weaker player, having a marginal role in 
the informal – as in the formal – legislative process.349 
 
341. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153.  
342. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294-295 (setting forth the change of 
power dynamics for both Parliament and the Council). 
343. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 189b.  
344. Michael Shackleton, The Politics of Codecision, 38 J. OF COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 325-342 (2000). 
345. Id. 
346. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149. 
347. Maja Kluger Dionigi & Christel Koop, Investigation of Informal 
Trilogue Negotiations Since the Lisbon Treaty-Added Value, Lack of 
Transparency and Possible Democratic Deficit, EUROPEAN ECON. & SOC. 
COMMITTEE 54 (July 2017), www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-01-
17-783-en-n.pdf.  
348. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1160-1161 
(concluding that Council gained a more powerful role in the trilogues, when 
compared to Parliament).  
349. Reh, supra note 319, at 835. 
306 UIC John Marshall Law Review [52:257 
 By contrast, a more structured shaping of trilogues follows. 
Trilogues are actually made of three different kind of meetings: 
bilateral meetings, technical trilogues and political trilogues.350 
They all begin after the Commission has made its proposal.351  
 Bilateral meetings work as the first and interlocutory place to 
check if there is any ground of general and potential agreement 
between the Council Presidency and the Parliament’s 
representatives, and their respective technical assistants, over the 
Commission’s proposal.352 Technical and political trilogues then 
begin and meetings are run with a rigid separation between 
technical and political sessions.353 No politicians are admitted in the 
technical trilogues, however assistants and counselors are allowed 
in political trilogues.354 Institutions do not want it to be possible for 
a technical meeting to become hybrid unless explicitly agreed.355 
Several rounds of sessions may be necessary to draft a compromise 
text. 
 Some logistical aspects could be useful to deeply understand 
how trilogues have changed traditional roles in the law-making 
procedure.  
 All political trilogues are held in the Parliament facilities and 
they are presided by Parliament’s committee chairs involved 
depending on the topic at stage.356 The trilogues Presidency decides 
about meetings’ convening and duration and keeps the fourth-
column document updated.357 Institutions’ delegations are not 
evenly constituted. The Parliament normally has the biggest 
representation (about thirty people, made up of politicians and 
staff), while the Council has the smallest (usually one to three 
people from the Presidency staff).358 The Commission’s delegation is 
made up of about eight to twelve people (and always at the highest 
level of hierarchy).359  
 As Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood find,  
Whilst formal rules of the game place Parliament at a disadvantage 
viz. the Council (the higher threshold for a majority in second reading, 
etc.), Parliament has acquired leverage over Council through the 
routines established by the CCC or its secretariat on a cross-
committee basis, dominance of logistical arrangements in trilogues, 
 
350. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153 
(contextualizing the three different types of meetings that make up trilogues). 
351. Id.  
352. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 17; TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 234, 244-
50, 290-91.  
353. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153 
354. Id. at 1157.  
355. Id. 
356. Dionigi & Koop, supra note 347, at 55.  
357. Id. at 52. 
358. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1154. 
359. Id. at 1155  
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and the advantage conferred by numbers in full political trilogues.360 
 Parliament’s delegation is bigger361 and used to driving 
political-based discussion: the size of the group matters and “the 
enlargement of the group favors the transitions of its norms to the 
form of law.”362 
 
E. Criticizing Trilogues: The Widening of the 
Democratic Deficit of EU Institutions 
 Trilogues are a successful strategy that discharge a potentially 
cumbersome procedure, reduce transaction costs, and increase the 
speed of decision-making. They make EU legislation more efficient 
and promote interinstitutional co-operation.363 
 Yet, some scholars maintain that whereas the efficiency of 
these meetings is undeniable, the necessary balance between cost-
time efficiencies and the principles of accountability, transparency 
and public participation remains to be determined.364 
 Critics of trilogues have focused on three major democratic 
challenges. First, the way the co-legislators come to decisions is 
undocumented and thus there is a lack of transparency of the 
legislative process365 and where Parliament and Council collude, 
they weaken public and minority control through mutual checks 
and balances taking the debate into secluded places of 
negotiation.366 
 
360. Id. at 1159. 
361. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 87 (Kurt H. Wolff, 
trans., The Free Press 1950).  
It will immediately be conceded on the basis of everyday experiences, 
that a group upon reaching a certain size must develop forms and organs 
which serve its maintenance and promotion, but which a smaller group 
does not need. On the other hand, it will also be admitted that smaller 
groups have qualities, including types of interaction among their 
members, which inevitably disappear when the groups grow larger. 
Id. 
362. Id. at 103. 
363. The codecision statistics support this view: more than 1,000 legislative 
acts have been passed since 1999; in the first half of the 2009-2014 EP, a first 
reading dossier took on average merely 14.4 months to conclude, and only 4 
percent of files went up to conciliation. European Parliament, Delegations to 
the Conciliation Committee, Activity Report 14 July 2009–31 December 2011, 
2012, 4-6.  
364. Rasmussen & Reh, supra note 334, at 1007-1008.  
365. Renzo Imbeni et al., Improving the Functioning of the Codecision 
Procedure, 2 (2001); Tony Bunyan, Secret Trilogues and the Democratic Deficit, 
7 (2007); Christine Reh, Informal Politics: The Normative Challenge, in INT’L 
HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE, 65-84 (Thomas Christiansen & 
Christine Neuhold, eds. 2012); Reh, supra note 319, at 826; STIE, supra note 
334. 
366. Christopher Lord, The Democratic Legitimacy of Codecision, 20 JUR. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1059-63 (2013). 
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 In addition, those authors have highlighted the constraints on 
political inclusion, public justification, and parliamentary 
deliberation where “debate in the plenary with the full participation 
of all political groups and members” is “reduced in importance by 
informal negotiations taking place elsewhere,” which reduce access 
opportunities for wider political debate.367 
 Finally, trilogues would differentiate access to, and control 
over, decision-making, while seclusion would reduce access to 
information. Such differentiations disproportionately empower big 
political parties (and their rapporteurs in particular) as well as big 
Member States (and their Presidencies in particular) at the expense 
of small political groups and rank-and-file parliamentarians.368 
 It is worth adding that trilogues have also raised the concerns 
of a broad spectrum of civil society and EU citizens, whose right to 
participate in the democratic life of the Union is being infringed.369 
Public discussion of legislative proposals is the essence of any 
democratic decision-making process, they say.370 This is why EU 
citizens must be directly involved during the legislative process and 
be able to scrutinize the performance of their representatives, as the 
Ombudsman argued.371 Most of the trilogue negotiations begin 
before the Parliament has adopted its first reading position 
officially, whereas the Council and the Parliament have already 
agreed on the final text of the legislation.372 As a result, the whole 
debate shifts from the plenary to closed-door meetings where only 
very few members of the Parliament take part.373 This would 
prevent an in-depth discussion of proposals by the elected 
representatives.  
 Thus, trilogues profoundly undermine and weaken the position 
of the only directly democratically-elected institution in the EU, the 
European Parliament. Furthermore, it means that the public 
cannot scrutinize the positions held in the course of the meetings by 
the rapporteur and shadow rapporteur, the Commission, and the 
 
367. Imbeni et al., supra note 365, at 2; Christopher Lord, The Democratic 
Legitimacy of Codecision, 20 JUR. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1059-63 (2013); Anne 
Elizabeth Stie, Democratic Decision-Making in the EU, Technology in Disguise?, 
in TECHNOLOGIES IN DISGUISE? (1st ed. 2013). 
368. Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, The Invisible Transformation of 
Codecision: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, SIEPS Report No 7 (2003); 
Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, Interorganizational Cooperation and 
Intraorganizational Power: Early Agreements under Codecision and Their 
Impact on the Parliament and the Council, 37 COMPARATIVE POL. STUD. 37(10) 
1184-1212 (2004). 
369. Open Letter to Martin Schulz, President of European Parliament, Jean-
Claude Juncker, President of European Comm’n, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 
Secretary-General of the Council, & Emily O'Reilly, European Ombudsmen 
(Sept. 30, 2015), edri.org/files/Transparency_LetterTrialogues_20150930.pdf.  
370. Id. 
371. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶ 20. 
372. Id. at ¶ 43. 
373. Dionigi & Koop, supra note 347, at 53-54. 
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Member States within the Council.  
 The disclosure policy of trilogue-related documents is also 
being contested. Contrary to the general rule of openness in 
legislative activity, neither the position of the three institutions nor 
the minutes of trilateral negotiations are disclosed to the public 
while the legislative process is ongoing.374 This would prevent public 
participation from taking place. 
 In its case-law regarding Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 
on public access, the European Court of Justice since Turco stressed 
that openness 
enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making 
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater 
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen 
in a democratic system. Those considerations are clearly of particular 
relevance where the Council is acting in its legislative capacity [...]. 
Openness in that respect contributes to strengthening democracy by 
allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed 
the basis of a legislative act. The possibility for citizens to find out the 
considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for 
the effective exercise of their democratic rights.375 
 In the post-Lisbon era, ECJ case-law has emphasized the 
formal division between legislative and non-legislative documents. 
In legislative acts the openness principle applies according to 
Article 15 TFEU376 thus in the ECJ case-law the right to access to 
documents relating trilogues has become particularly topical.377 
 In a nutshell, for critics of trilogues, openness and 
transparency constitute the best means to overcome the “democratic 
deficit” and to make the EU closer to citizens. 
 
F. Advocating Trilogues: Efficiency, Democracy, and 
Legitimacy 
 Starting from the famous Lincoln declination of democracy,378 
there have been three main normative criteria through which the 
dimension of the democratic deficit that invests the European 
 
374. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶¶ 56-57.  
375. Grand Chamber, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P., Kingdom of 
Sweden and Maurizio Turco v. Council, 2008, ¶¶ 45-46. 
376. TFEU, supra note 112 at art. 15 (stating “1. In order to promote good 
governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. 
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when 
considering and voting on a draft legislative act”).  
377. Päivi Leino, Secrecy, Efficiency, Transparency in EU Negotiations: 
Conflicting Paradigms?, 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 6-15 (2017). 
378. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, in AM. HERITAGE 
BOOK OF GREAT AM. SPEECHES 91-92 (Suzanne McIntire, ed. 2001) “[…] this 
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that government of 
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” Id. 
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institutions was measured in literature. On the one hand, output 
effectiveness for the people; on the other hand, input participation 
by (and of) the people.379 
 Those arguments have to be addressed to ensure that the 
trilogues enhance democracy, legitimacy, and efficiency. 
 
1. Do Trilogues Strengthen EU Efficiency? 
 The process of European integration has proceeded on the 
presumption that the legitimacy of the EU emanates from its 
capacity to deliver the wanted results.380 In other words, one of the 
strongest rationales to advocate legitimacy in EU institutions (and 
actions) has been based on its effectiveness. As already argued 
before in this article, it is widely known and acknowledged by both 
scholars and professionals that trilogues enhance effectiveness. 
Small delegations, with a strong legislative mandate by their 
sending institutions, are more capable of finding early agreements. 
If a compromise text is accomplished, it is more likely that it may 
encounter the favor of people whom are going to be affected by it.381 
Trilogues meet output legitimacy, strengthening the role of the EU 
institutions, which are perceived as more effective and thus closer 
to the needs of the people.382  
 In addition to the EU’s action efficiency, trilogues also reinforce 
everything in between the inputs and outputs, which is referred to 
as throughput legitimacy.383  
 
 
379. Schmidt, supra note 122, at 4 (arguing “[t]he concepts of output and 
input legitimacy as applied to the EU have their origins in the work of Scharpf 
[F.W. SCHARPF, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung. Konstanz 
1970], who delineated ‘output-oriented’ legitimization as centering on the 
ability of EU institutions to govern effectively for the people and ‘input-oriented’ 
legitimization as involving political participation by the people”).  
380.Karl-Oskar Lindgren & Thomas Persson, Input and Output Legitimacy: 
Synergy or Trade-Off? Empirical Evidence From an EU Survey, 17 J. OF EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y, 449, 450 (2010).  
381. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149-50; 14 July 
2009 Activity Report, supra note 302302, at 19, 43. 
382. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149-50.  
383. Schmidt, supra note 122, at 5, 
‘Throughput’ legitimacy concentrates on what goes on inside the ‘black 
box’ of EU governance, in the space between the political input and the 
policy output, which has typically been left blank by political systems 
theorists. It focuses on the quality of the governance processes of the EU 
as contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy from both the 
performance-oriented legitimacy of output and the participation-
oriented legitimacy of input. Throughput is process-oriented, and based 
on the interactions – institutional and constructive – of all actors 
engaged in EU governance.  
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2. Is Democracy Actually Affected by Trilogue Delegations’ 
Size, as Most Critics Affirm? 
 There are many arguments that can be used against that 
assertion. First, such delegations are normally exploited in any 
democratic system in order to find early agreements at any given 
level where majority decisions have to be taken, well before those 
decisions must formally be taken. Second, despite what happened 
in early trilogues, Parliament’s delegations are now appointed 
according to the Rules of Procedure as amended in 2017; along with 
the Chair of the Committee responsible, the majority is also 
represented in EP delegations as well as minority or any political 
group which wish to participate in the informal negotiations.384 
Third, delegations receive a clear negotiating mandate during 
plenary sessions and bilateral talks do not start before both 
Parliament and Council mandates are in place.385 Furthermore, 
respective delegations cannot depart from the given mandates 
during negotiations.386 The Council, as an institution participating 
in trilogues, should be less affected by that kind of criticism because 
the Council’s law-making process always used to be secret and not 
transparent.387 However, the Council has traditionally conditioned 
the opening of trilogue negotiations to the support of substantive 
majority, elaborated through an open (although not public) process 
allowing each national delegation to annotate a draft proposal 
circulated by the Presidency and Secretariat.388 
 Fourth, any compromise text agreed during trilogues is then 
subject to the final vote of the plenary in the Parliament and the 
Council, according to general rules provided in the Treaties: 
procedures, voting, and majority thresholds remain those of the 
ordinary legislative procedure along with the guarantees thereof.389 
 Moreover, all the procedural guarantees discussed in the first 
part of this article, as an early warning system, have increased 
involvement of national parliaments and regions. Further, ECJ 
authority over subsidiarity and proportionality may be activated 
immediately after the Commission has made its new legislative 
proposal; therefore, well before the trilogues start.390  
 Finally, scholars generally agree that the Parliament’s role in 
the legislative process has improved since trilogues have been 
institutionalized.391 Since the Parliament is the unique institution 
 
384. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(1). 
385. Id. at Rules 69(c)-69(e). 
386. Id. at Rules 69(d)-69(e). 
387. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 41-46 (discussing the make-
up and composition of the Council, along with its dynamics).  
388. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1159-1160 
(explaining the process by which the trilogues begin through open means).  
389. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294. 
390. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.  
391. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1159 (pointing 
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directly elected by the people, a Parliament-driven trilogue model 
offers major guarantees in terms of democracy, legitimacy and 
representation. 
 
3. Does Legitimacy Really Depend on Openness and 
Transparency? 
 As long as treaties and regulations provide for the general rule 
of working as openly as possible, they also provide derogations and 
exclusions as well. For example, Article 4(3) of Regulation 
1049/2001 set a meaningful exception: 
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use 
or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the 
decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if 
disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the 
institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding 
public interest in disclosure.392 
 Article 4(3) has been used irrespectively of the distinction 
between legislative and non-legislative actions, which does not 
reflect the realities of EU decision-making, where many procedures 
do not fall clearly under either of these two categories.393 
 The European Ombudsman has recently closed a strategic 
inquiry concerning the proactive transparency of trilogues, 
stressing their role as the forum where the deals are done.394 The 
issue at stake was the correct trade-off between transparency and 
efficiency of trilogues: which information and documents could be 
made available to the public, and when.395 Also, the Ombudsman 
maintained that “[i]t is arguable that the interest in well-
functioning trilogue negotiations temporarily outweighs the 
interest in transparency for as long as the trilogue negotiations are 
ongoing,”396 recommending, however, that the four-column 
documents should be made proactively available as soon as possible 
after the negotiations have been concluded.397 
 Finally, some recent Court cases398 on the neglected disclosure 
 
out that “Parliament has acquired leverage over Council through the routines 
established by the CCC or its secretariat on a cross-committee basis, dominance 
of logistical arrangements in trilogues, and the advantage conferred by numbers 
in full political trilogues”).  
392. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission Documents, 2001 O.J., art. 4(3).  
393. Case C-612/13 P, ClientEarth v. Commission, 2015; Case T-402/12, 
Schlyter v. Commission, 2015 (confirmed by European Court of Justice (fourth 
chamber) C-331/15 P, 2017). 
394. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶¶ 4-5. 
395. Id.  
396. Id. at ¶ 54. 
397. Id. at ¶ 56. 
398. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Commission (2016); Herbert Smith 
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of documents relating to the trilogue stage of negotiations confirm 
that the argument based on transparency is 
necessary for the legislative process to be understood, constitutes 
in itself a public interest that must be protected […], cannot 
provide an appropriate basis for establishing that the principle of 
transparency is of especially pressing concern and could thus 
prevail over the reasons justifying the refusals to grant access to 
the requested documents.399 
 The institution concerned has to weigh the particular interest 
to be protected through non-disclosure and “[t]he exchanging of 
legal views between the legal services of three institutions in order 
to reach a compromise regarding a legislative text in the context of 
a trilogue may, where appropriate, be described as legal advice and, 
as a result, may fall under the exception relating to legal advice.”400 
Further, “[t]he legal services act under a mandate and with the aim 
of reaching an agreement.”401 “They thus simultaneously act as 
negotiators and advisers with regard to legal matters.”402 It is worth 
noting that the concept of ‘legal advice’ is not defined in Regulation 
No 1049/2001 and it is apparent from the case-law in Turco that the 
concept of ‘legal advice’ relates to the content of a document and not 
to its author or its addressees.403  
As is apparent from a literal interpretation of the words ‘legal 
advice’, this is a question of advice relating to a legal issue, 
regardless of the way in which that advice is given. In other words, 
it is irrelevant, for the purposes of applying the exception relating 
to the protection of legal advice, whether the document containing 
that advice was provided at an early, late or final stage of the 
decision-making process. In the same way, the fact of the advice 
having been given in a formal or informal context has no effect on 
the interpretation of those words.404  
 The most recent jurisprudence of the Court, therefore, 
definitely supports arguments in favor of trilogues, not only over 
their valuable contribution to the efficiency of the EU law-making 
process, but even over the sustainable trade-off between their 
legitimacy and democracy shape over critics’ openness and 
transparency claims.  
 
 
Freehills LLP v. Council (2016); Philip Morris Ltd v. Commission (2016). The 
pending case T-540/15 De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2015 concerns 
especially the four-column documents used as a basis for trilogues and will be 
delivered (supposedly) in March 22 2018. 
399. Case T-710/14, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Council (2016), ¶ 72 
[hereinafter Case T-710/14]. 
400. Id. at ¶ 59. 
401. Id. at ¶ 60. 
402. Id. at ¶ 60. 
403. Sweden and Turco v. Council, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, 
cit., ¶¶ 38-39. 
404. Case T-710/14, supra note 399, at ¶ 48. 
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENT AND REGULATION WITHIN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. The Current Context 
 Four years after President Obama announced that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) would design a 
regulatory strategy to reduce carbon emissions, in what would form 
the basis of the Clean Power Plan,405 President Trump announced 
his intention to eliminate American involvement in the Paris 
Agreement.406 The resulting change in American policy has been 
dramatic. The rollbacks began almost immediately.  
 Within four months of inauguration, for example, changes were 
made to eliminate protection for streams, fuel efficiency regulations 
had been called into question, a basic re-write of the Clean Power 
Plan had been ordered, and requirements forbidding the dumping 
of toxic chemicals had been altered.407 The results were the largest 
rollback in such a limited time-frame in the EPA’s history.408 By 
December 2018, according to The New York Times, seventy-eight 
environmental rules had either been eliminated since Trump 
became president or were on their way to elimination, covering such 
areas as air pollution and emissions, water pollution, and drilling 
and extraction.409  
 
405. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R 60). 
406. Trump stated:  
Therefore, in order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its 
citizens, the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord 
— (applause) — thank you, thank you – but begin negotiations to reenter 
either the Paris Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that 
are fair to the United States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its 
taxpayers. So we’re getting out. But we will start to negotiate, and we 
will see if we can make a deal that’s fair. And if we can, that’s great. And 
if we can’t, that’s fine. 
President Donald J. Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 
2017), perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP.  
407. Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is Rolling Back Obama’s 
Legacy, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018),  
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obama-
rules/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bab12161ea44; see also Lisa Friedman & 
Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Drafts Rule on Coal Plants to Replace Clean Power Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/clean-power-
plan-replacement.html (describing Trump Administration’s drafting of far less 
stringent rules to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power 
plants). 
408. James L. Gattuso, Trump’s Red Tape Rollback, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 
12, 2017), www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/trumps-red-
tape-rollback. 
409. Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, 78 
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 As the American federal government systematically began 
eliminating the methodologies designed to ensure American 
compliance with the Paris Agreement, other parties – state 
governments, municipal governments, private enterprises – began 
to step forth and assert their role in combatting climate change.410 
Climate change is global, and it involves basic questions of 
international relations, traditionally the realm of the federal 
government. As non-federal actors have increasingly asserted 
themselves, basic questions of federalism in the environmental 
context have increasingly arisen.411 One issue is the question of 
preemption, that is whether federal climate change legislation (or 
lack thereof) should preempt state and local laws.412 Thus Part IV 
of this article first provides a brief overview of federalism concepts 
in the United States, second examines the role of environmental 
protection within the federalism debate, and finally examines some 
of the non-federal responses to the need for action related to climate 
change. 
 
B. American Federalism and the Environment 
 The issue of federalism in the United States is complex. While 
there is a host of regulations at each of the federal, state, and local 
levels, the interplay between them is not always clear. In the United 
States, the federal government’s power is enumerated in the 
Constitution, and it can only exercise those powers granted to it.413 
 While the United States Constitution provides the federal 
government with numerous exclusive powers, such as dealing with 
foreign relations, the military, trade across national and state 
 
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-
reversed.html. 
410. Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, 
States and Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), 
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html. 
411. This topic has been debated for some time. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et 
al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and 
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 
(2008) (discussing Translocal Organizations of Government Actors); Benjamin 
K. Sovacool & Marilyn A. Brown, Scaling the Policy Response to Climate 
Change, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 317 (2009) (reviewing strategies for addressing 
climate change and noting the importance of state and global action); David M 
Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Exporting Air Pollution? Regulatory Enforcement 
and Environmental Free Riding in the United States, 63 POL. RES. Q. 771 (2010) 
(questioning the Clean Air Act and free-riding behavior). 
412. See, e.g., Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of 
Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy 
to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 236 (2009) 
(describing preemption and the importance of states in combatting climate 
change). 
413. RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES 
IN CONTEXT 307 (3d ed. 2017) (citations omitted). 
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borders, and the monetary system,414 other powers exist concurrent 
with the states, such as regulating elections, taxing, borrowing 
money, and establishing a system of courts.415 Finally, the federal 
government is given implied powers that are “necessary and proper” 
to allow it to execute its enumerated powers.416  
 Among those powers granted to the federal government is the 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”417 In addition to 
regulating interstate commerce, Congress may also “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.”418 That is, Congress may tax and spend. The power to tax 
gives the government an element of control over activities it cannot 
directly regulate. Further, the power to spend means that funding 
may come only with conditions attached.419 And of course, the extent 
of the government’s powers is broader than those enumerated, as 
the Constitution authorizes Congress to “make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers.”420 
 The States are not limited by enumerated powers. Their 
powers arise elsewhere. The powers of states were not clearly 
delineated until 1791 with the passage of the 10th Amendment, 
which states that “powers not delegated to the United States … nor 
prohibited by [the Constitution] to the States, are reserved to the 
States … or to the people.”421 Thus, the states can and do perform 
many of the vital functions of modern government through the 
police power,422 including criminal laws, running local public 
schools, and zoning. 
 The issue of the interplay between the overlapping area of 
regulatory competency is the question at the heart of federalism. At 
its most basic, federalism is the allocation of powers and 
responsibilities among the national, state, and local governmental 
powers.423 While all levels of government participate in the 
governing process, each operates independent of the others to some 
degree. America has a system of dual sovereignty, where sovereign 
power is recognized both in the individual states and in the federal 
government.424 Federalism deals with the question of which level of 
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government can deal with regulatory issues, and its framework is 
directly integrated into the United States Constitution. 
 American federalism is designed to achieve a number of core 
values of good governance. These include maintaining checks and 
balances of power to protect individuals, preserving governmental 
accountability and transparency, maintaining local autonomy to 
enable innovation and competition and to protect local interests, 
keeping a centralized authority to address collective action issues, 
and maintaining the benefits in problem solving offered by the joint 
action of local and federal governments.425 
 But federalism issues are complicated in the area of the 
environment. There are both practical and legal impediments to 
state and local regulations related to climate change in the United 
States. Climate change is global in nature, not local. Global 
warming and greenhouse gas emissions are felt everywhere, as are 
changes in the sea level and sea temperatures and countless other 
atmospheric concerns.426 As a practical matter, these climate-
related issues have international repercussions well beyond the 
scope and scale of what is typically addressed through state or 
municipal legislation. As noted, the Constitution charges the 
federal government, rather than the states and localities, with 
managing international relations.427 A clear benefit of delegating 
this to the federal government, is presumably the creation of a 
unified national position. This is done without the concern that 
state or municipal action could lead to policies that are at odds with 
those of the federal government. Climate change is obviously a 
global problem that will ultimately require concerted international 
action, but what this means as to the authority and ability of local 
actors to engage in proactive action to combat climate change is a 
different question.  
 Thus, a critical question in relation to American federalism is 
the question of preemption. The Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution makes clear that the United States Constitution and 
laws and treaties made pursuant to it are the supreme law of the 
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land.428 Yet, despite the breadth of the Constitutional mandate, 
most legal areas are governed concurrently by federal and state 
law.429 The question thus is when preemption would be appropriate 
in the environmental context and when it serves to defeat the core 
values federalism is designed to achieve. Much of the argument for 
preemption stems from the enormous economic importance of 
maintaining a single national economy. Preemption on this ground 
is usually linked to the Commerce Clause, and it too could have 
major implications for state programs.430 In theory, state climate 
change initiatives could impede national markets via the 
implementation of local regulations.431 
 Yet, in the area of climate change, even before the past few 
years when the federal government has either failed to act or has 
acted to de-regulate the environment, state and local governments 
have been proactive. For example, regulation of environmental 
injury to specific lands is done through local legislation.432 In fact, 
every American state has enacted legislation to address climate 
change.433 California has lead the way, with legislation aimed, 
among other areas, at reducing greenhouse emissions from 
automobiles and electrical generators.434 Given both global and local 
concerns, a dual approach seems desirable. Yet when the national 
and the local approaches to environmental control diverge, 
federalism issues rise to the forefront. These issues are not new to 
the Supreme Court, which has addressed federalism concerns in 
numerous contexts related to the environment.435 
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 Special problems arise when states do not have consistent 
policies (though the issue is analogous when countries lack 
consistent policies as well). The problem is one of “leakage,” and the 
problems internationally and domestically are analogous.436 
Internationally, the leakage phenomenon occurs when Country A 
limits greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in the offending 
producers of greenhouse gases moving or “leaking” into unregulated 
(or less regulated) Country B.437 The result potentially is the 
weakening of environmental legislation. Not only is the global 
effectiveness of Country A’s regulations undercut, but Country A 
will be put at a competitive disadvantage as well.438 And just as 
leakage creates problems between Countries A and B, leakage can 
create analogous problems when adjacent states have differing 
levels of environmental regulation in place. 
 Other issues confront the states as well. For example, a 
potential practical constraint on states could be their limited 
technical capacity for dealing with the enormous complexity of 
climate change.439 Many have argued that the federal level might 
be the most efficient venue for scientific inquiry into environmental 
concerns, because national agencies could take advantage of scale 
economies in research and could act as central clearing houses for 
information.440  
 On the other side, state regulation may provide opportunities 
which the federal government lacks. For example, in the realm of 
adaptation–that is, efforts designed to deal with the consequences 
of global warming instead of the cause – the use of forestry and 
vegetation to combat greenhouse gases seems to readily fall within 
the realm of state regulations, as they require land use controls, an 
area regularly regulated by the states.  
 
C. Non-Federal Responses to Climate Change 
 In light of these concerns, non-federal actors have responded in 
a myriad of ways, ranging from coalitions to action by the states to 
municipal responses to business-lead initiatives.441 A brief overview 
of some prominent responses suggest the seriousness with which 
the issue is being addressed. 
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 To begin with, a number of coalitions have emerged. For 
example, America’s Pledge, launched by Michael Bloomberg and 
Jerry Brown, is designed to aggregate and quantify the activity of 
states, cities, and businesses toward limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions consistent with the Paris Agreement.442 The Pledge aims 
to “[c]ollect data on non-national climate action to quantify and 
report on progress made towards the US pledge (Nationally 
Determined Contribution) under the Paris Agreement[,] 
[c]ommunicate the findings and results of [their] research and data 
collected from non-national actors to the international community 
and the United Nations,” and “[c]atalyze further climate action in 
the near term by providing detailed roadmaps for similar business-
level, city, and state action in the US and, potentially, in other 
countries around the world.”443 
 At the 2017 Bonn Conference on Climate Change, 20 U.S. 
states, more than 50 major American cities, and more than 60 of the 
country’s largest businesses pledged to meet emission reduction 
goals.444 Added together, the economic power of these entities would 
be the third biggest economy in the world, trailing only the U.S. and 
China.445 The commitment, however, is unlikely to satisfy the 
pledges necessary to achieve the American obligations under the 
Paris Agreement.446 
 A similar approach has been developed by the We Are Still In 
Coalition.447 The Coalition, formed in direct response to President 
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Trump withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, is comprised of 
cities, states, businesses, and other organizations who remain 
committed to complying with the Paris Agreement and to helping 
America reach its Paris targets.448 The main function of the 
coalition is to connect all the individuals, companies, and 
organizations who are committed to climate action and help pool all 
the resources and actions to share knowledge to achieve the 
common goal.449 As of this writing, signatories include 2,162 
businesses and investors, 282 cities and counties, 348 colleges and 
universities, 55 cultural institutions, 28 health care organizations, 
43 faith groups, 10 states, and 9 tribes.450 
 Significant state action pre-dates America’s withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement. By 2006, every state had taken steps of some 
kind to address climate change.451 Currently, 33 states have 
implemented comprehensive plans devoted to climate change.452 It 
is estimated that the benefits of these measures will result in a 17% 
decrease in emissions by 2025 as compared to 2005 levels.453 
 California has been particularly proactive. In addition to 
enacting legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions from 
automobiles and electrical generators, with an eye on Paris 
Agreement targets, California recently extended a program first 
enacted in 2006 until 2030 which established a cap-and-trade 
emissions system.454 The goal is to achieve a 40% cut in climate-
warming emissions by 2030, when compared to 1990 levels.455 The 
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program requires emitters to either reduce emissions or purchase 
permits allowing emissions from those who have.456 With 
approximately 39 million people and the world’s sixth largest 
economy, and with an economic output of $2.4 trillion, these 
programs can make a profound difference.457 
 In addition, California has a “decarbonization” program that 
creates numerous jobs and helps the State move away from the use 
of fossil fuels.458 It also recently approved a requirement that nearly 
all new homes be equipped with solar panels by 2020.459 California 
also plans to adhere to the Obama-era requirement that the average 
mileage for a truck or car be 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025.460 
 Washington Governor Jay Inslee has been trying to institute 
the country’s first tax on carbon dioxide pollution for a number of 
years.461 Opponents’ concerns center on the issue of whether the tax 
would increase the price of both gasoline and electricity.462  
 In Colorado, then-Governor John Hickenlooper (a former 
candidate for President in 2020)463 issued an executive order on July 
11, 2017 regarding Colorado’s plan to use cleaner energy 
resources.464 The following goals were laid out: first, to reduce 
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greenhouse gas emissions by more than 26% of 2005 levels by 2025; 
second, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from electricity by 25% 
of 2012 levels by 2025 and 35% by 2030; and third, by 2020 to have 
saved 2% of total electricity sales by utilizing cost-effective 
electricity.465 In order to achieve those goals, Colorado agencies will 
team up with electric utilities or cooperatives and increase their use 
of renewable energy, as long as it does not increase the cost of 
electricity to consumers or cause service to be unreliable.466 The 
Colorado Energy Office, the Regional Air Quality Council, and the 
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment are 
charged with developing the plan to reduce air pollution.467 The 
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment is also 
charged with developing an approach to addressing state 
greenhouse gas emissions.468  
 New Jersey passed two bills on April 12, 2018, each requiring 
power companies to generate 50 percent of their electricity from 
renewable sources and to subsidize existing nuclear power plants 
by 2030.469 Assembly Bill 3723, introduced on March 22, 2018, lays 
out New Jersey’s clean energy and energy efficiency programs and 
modifies the solar renewable energy portfolio standards.470 Forty 
percent of New Jersey’s electricity comes from nuclear energy and 
an annual subsidy of $300 million for existing nuclear plants was 
announced with the bills.471 Although nuclear energy is not favored 
by some because of safety and disposal concerns, it is considered a 
clean energy because it emits no greenhouse gases.472 Nuclear 
energy, although not without faults, is a stepping stone to continue 
the transition away from fossil fuels to cleaner energy.  
 As for cities, the Climate Mayors Initiative is a group of 407 
mayors who have agreed to adhere to the Paris Agreement by 
adopting and intensifying existing efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and switch to clean energy.473 It was founded in 2014, and 
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it has gained even more traction in light of the withdrawal of the 
United States from the Paris Agreement by President Trump.474 
Like the We Are Still In Coalition, the Climate Mayors Initiative 
serves as a platform and network for mayors who want to share 
resources and other advances they are making related to climate 
change.  
 At the conclusion of the December 2017 North American 
Climate Summit, 57 mayors signed the Chicago Climate Charter, 
representing their commitment to the Paris Agreement.475 The 
main commitments include the following: first, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent with the Paris 
Agreement; second, to measure, track, and report emissions; third, 
to request more authority for cities to create laws and policies; 
fourth, to ensure diversity in opinions and ideas when establishing 
goals, policies, procedures; fifth, to develop plans that address 
adaptation and remediation, not just reduction; sixth, to work on a 
city, state, and federal level to incentivize all actors; and seventh, to 
consult with experts and others who can help foster solutions.476
 And, of course, numerous individual cities have acted on 
climate change. Los Angeles has launched the Sustainable City 
pLAn, providing, among other things, for the launching of a green 
technology incubator, for building public transit, for adding 
charging stations for electric vehicles, and for reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions at the port of Los Angeles.477 San Francisco has 
announced the goal of being a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions 
city by 2050.478 Chicago has vowed to reduce GHG emissions by 25% 
of 1990 levels by 2020 and by 80% by 2050 and to complete an 
energy efficiency retrofit in 23,000 homes and 132 buildings 
spanning over 70 million square feet, saving nearly $17 million/year 
and over 91,000 metric tons of avoided GHG emissions.479 It has also 
proposed a policy known as “Building on Burnham,” which is a 
comprehensive strategy to invest in Chicago’s lakefront, natural 
areas, and recreational areas across the city.480 Salt Lake City 
officials have established goals of “relying on renewable energy for 
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50% of municipal operations by 2020 and [of] generating 100% of 
the community’s electric supply through renewable energy by 
2032.”481 “Washington, D.C. has set a goal of using renewables to 
meet 50% of its energy supply by 2032.”482 And there are many more 
such efforts. 
 As for businesses, it is clear that successfully combatting 
climate change will have to result from a public-private 
partnership. The financial strength of many multi-national 
corporations necessitates their involvement, and numerous 
corporations have stepped up with plans to address these issues. To 
date, over two thirds of publicly traded companies have pledges to 
reduce GHG emissions, and 36% of those companies have set 
deadlines to do so.483 Approximately one third of these businesses 
have made commitments to transition to renewable energy.484 A few 
examples suffice. General Mills has reported a goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 28% by 2025 and to eventually be in line 
with the Paris Agreement by 2050.485 One hundred percent of 
Apple’s facilities are powered with clean energy, including retail 
stores, offices, data centers, and co-located facilities.486 Moreover, 23 
of its suppliers have also committed to use 100% clean energy.487 
Apple has 25 global renewable energy projects with 626 megawatts 
of generation capacity and 286 megawatts of solar photovoltaic 
generation.488 Since 2011, Apple’s projects have reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions by 54% and prevented 2.1 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent.489 Walmart has launched Project 
Gigaton to eliminate one gigaton of greenhouse gases from 2015 to 
2030.490 Project Gigaton focuses on six areas: energy, agriculture, 
deforestation, packaging, waste, and product use.491 Walmart has 
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become one of the country’s leading commercial solar and on-site 
renewable energy users, obtaining approximately a quarter of its 
global energy from renewable sources.492 In 2017, Google purchased 
energy from renewable resources sufficient to power 100% of its 
energy consumption.493 
 
D. Conclusion 
 If climate change is going to be successfully addressed in a 
meaningful fashion and the targets of the Paris Agreement are to 
be met, it is clear that all levels of government must exercise their 
powers, whether exclusive or concurrent, and all varieties of 
businesses must contribute to the cause. The division of authority 
among overlapping competencies can work to aid, rather than 
detract from, the achievement of the goal as each actor can address 
those aspects of the problem it is best situated to address.  
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